Third-Party Prejudice Accommodation Increases Gender Discrimination
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Online First Publication, October 18, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pspi0000164

CITATION
Third-Party Prejudice Accommodation Increases Gender Discrimination

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We investigated how gatekeepers sometimes arrive at discriminatory hiring selections to accommodate prejudiced third parties due to role demands (i.e., the “third-party prejudice effect”). Studies 1 and 2 show that individuals in charge of personnel decisions were significantly less likely to select a woman when a relevant third party (the chief executive officer of the company in Study 1; the “proposer” in an ultimatum game in Study 2) was prejudiced against women. Gatekeepers accommodate third-party prejudice in this way in order to avoid conflict in relations and task-related problems that would likely occur if the gatekeeper introduced a member of the target of prejudice into an organization. Studies 3 and 4 demonstrated that both interpersonal and task-focused concerns significantly mediated third-party prejudice accommodation. Furthermore, experimentally reducing task-focused concerns significantly reduced the accommodation of third-party prejudice against women (Study 4). We also found that gatekeepers accommodate third-party prejudice regardless of their own beliefs and attitudes (Studies 5 and 6), or their own desire to get along or affiliate with the third party (Study 7), and despite leading to feelings of guilt (Studies 4 and 5). Both men and women accommodated third-party prejudice against women. A role-based framework can be useful to understand the persistence of gender inequality in various fields and organizations, even as individuals endorse increasingly gender-egalitarian views.

Keywords: decision-making, gender bias, prejudice, role theory, social influence

Supplemental materials: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pspi0000164.supp

Despite a trend over the last 30 years toward more egalitarian gender attitudes (Cotter, Hermens, & Vanneman, 2011; Donnelly et al., 2016), gender inequality persists. For example, women occupy only 5% of CEO positions at S&P 500 companies (Catalyst, 2018) but constitute close to 80% of secretarial staff in those firms (Hegewisch & Hartmann, 2014). In addition to other factors such as gender differences in interests and goals (Diekman & Eagly, 2008), gender discrimination in the hiring process plays a causal role in the gender segregation of the labor market (Eagly & Heilman, 2016) and makes it difficult for women to attain positions traditionally dominated by men (Heilman, 2001). Whereas past work has often conceptualized these barriers in terms of gatekeepers who are consciously or unconsciously biased and discriminate against women (Rudman, Moss-Racusin, Phelan, & Nauts, 2012), we investigated how discrimination can also arise in ways independent of individuals’ personal attitudes and stereotypes, occurring as a result of perceiving other peoples’ prejudices.

There is a considerable body of work showing that individuals’ intergroup attitudes (Talaska, Fiske, & Chaiken, 2008) and social identities (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) shape their preferences and the kinds of decisions they make involving other people. For instance, when it comes to employment decisions involving female job candidates, those with more progressive gender attitudes tend to show a greater preference for hiring women (Hoyt, 2012). Similarly, individuals often display a strong tendency to favor members of their own social groups over members of other groups (Greenwald & Pettigrew, 2014), an in-group favoritism that sometimes manifests in women’s stronger preference (relative to men) to hire female job candidates (Koch, D’Mello, & Sackett, 2015). In addition to these direct effects of personal attitudes and social identities, the demands of formal roles may influence gatekeepers in charge of hiring in a way that aligns their decisions with the perceived prejudices of relevant third parties (the “third-party prejudice effect”).

People often behave in accordance with the perceived views of others rather than their own. From a normative perspective, the attitudes held by other in-group members can function as norms that shape individuals’ behaviors, including discrimination, with the objective of being accepted or liked by those individuals or to avoid their disapproval (Blanchard, Crandall, Brigham, & Vaughn, 1994). Authority figures can also exert influence through normative processes, as others tend to conform to their perceived biases to avoid punishment (Brief, Buttram, Elliott, Reizenstein, & McCline, 1995; Brief, Dietz, Cohen, Pugh, & Vaslow, 2000). For example, Brief, Buttram, Elliott, Reizenstein, and McCline (1995, 2000) showed that college students complied with direct orders to discriminate issued by an authority figure that were couched in a business justification (e.g., keeping the workforce homogenous to improve performance). More generally, the perceived attitudes of
in-group members and peers may communicate whether it is acceptable or not to express bias in a given context, and often determine whether discrimination will occur (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003).

We complement this normative view by proposing an additional perspective drawing from role theory (Biddle, 1979, 1986) to explain why individuals sometimes arrive at discriminatory decisions in accordance with the perceived views of other people, and often in ways different from what would be expected based on their personal attitudes or social identities. Role theory posits that there are specific behavioral expectations and priorities ("role demands") associated with particular roles that people occupy (Biddle, 1979, 1986). In contexts in which those roles are salient, independent of concerns about the approval of others, the demands associated with those roles can have a powerful influence on behavior (Charrig, Pilavin, & Callero, 1988; Stryker & Serpe, 1982), focusing attention on role-relevant cues and information (Collier & Callero, 2005). For example, in a study by Pratto, Tatar, and Conway-Lanz (1999), participants placed in the role of loan officer made lending decisions that were based on need when their role was defined in terms of helping the community but focused on merit when their role was to prioritize bank profits. This research illustrates how, in addition to behaving in ways to elicit approval or avoid disapproval from other people (i.e., normative influence), people often behave in accordance with the expectations of the role they currently occupy.

Whereas role theory has often been applied to examine how role demands can shape dyadic interactions (e.g., Broderick, 1998) and impact the way people think of themselves (Richeson & Ambady, 2001a; Stryker & Burke, 2000), we further propose that role demands can also help explain why other people’s biases can sometimes influence individuals’ responses to women, in general, and hiring decisions, in particular. When people are in a formal recruitment role, they not only seek to identify someone who is competent for the job, but also who is a good fit with existing organizational members (Rivera, 2012; Rynes, & Gerhart, 1990; Tsai, Chi, Huang, & Hsu, 2011). Better fit between a job candidate and relevant third parties is positively associated not only with that candidate’s job performance (Kristof-Brown, Zimmerman, & Johnson, 2005) but also with overall social cohesion (Seong, Kristof-Brown, Park, Hong, & Shin, 2015), and with higher trust in the organization, better group communication, and increased interpersonal attraction (Edwards & Cable, 2009). When a gatekeeper in charge of hiring believes that a relevant third party (e.g., the new hire’s future coworker or supervisor) is biased against women, this inference would render one particular decision (hiring a woman) relatively incompatible with the demands of the gatekeeper role.

Such incompatibility could manifest in two kinds of considerations for gatekeepers. One type of consideration is focused on maintaining social cohesion and minimizing friction between the third party and the new hire (i.e., “interpersonal concerns”). Another, conceptually related, type of consideration centers on whether a new hire would work effectively together with the third party to successfully accomplish organizational tasks and goals (i.e., “task-focused concerns”). These two considerations—interpersonal and task-focused—reflect well-established distinctions between socioemotional and instrumental dimensions of group processes (Bales & Slater, 1955; Nadler & Snabel, 2015; Vianen, 2000). Gatekeepers might accommodate the biases of a relevant third party as a way to meet these perceived role demands, resulting in discrimination against women.

We present our theoretical model, which guides the current research, in Figure 1. We tested this model in seven experiments in which participants were placed in the role of someone in charge of making a hiring decision or coordinating people to work together. Across studies, we manipulated the inference that a relevant third party held attitudes or opinions indicative of prejudice against women in different ways. In line with path a in the model, we expected preference for a female candidate to be lower when there

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**Figure 1.** Perception of third-party prejudice against women results in reduced preference for a female candidate (path a) independently from decision makers’ social category group (path b) and independently from decision makers’ own gender attitudes (path c) because of role-relevant concerns (e.g., interpersonal and task-focused concerns), which are increased when the third party is perceived to be prejudiced against women (vs. not; paths c and d). Reduced preference for a female candidate as a result of prejudice accommodation leads decision makers to experience less positive affect and increased self-directed negative affect (i.e., feelings of guilt; path f), to the extent that they are internally motivated to respond without sexism (path g).
were cues to suggest that the third party was prejudiced against women (vs. no cues; Hypothesis 1). We tested Hypothesis 1 in all seven studies. Furthermore, given our theorizing that people accommodate prejudice against women because this prejudice renders the decision to hire a woman incompatible with role demands (i.e., to hire someone who will work well with existing organizational members and excel at the job), we expected to find that interpersonal and task-focused concerns would mediate the accommodation effect (Hypothesis 2), in line with path $c$ and path $d$ in Figure 1. We tested this prediction in Studies 3 and 4 by assessing participants’ beliefs that hiring a female candidate would (a) create personal difficulties and (b) jeopardize task completion, and by testing whether these concerns mediated participant selections.

Moreover, whereas the salience of the gatekeeper role and the strength of role demands were constant for participants in all other studies, we further pursued Hypothesis 2 in Study 4 by manipulating the perception that a female candidate would be successful at the job. From a role-based perspective, when a new hire’s successful job performance is virtually guaranteed (vs. not), hiring a woman would be less incompatible with gatekeepers’ role demands regardless of the attitudes of the relevant third party. Thus, we would expect the accommodation of prejudice to be reduced.

In addition to testing the direct effect of cues to third-party prejudice against women on gatekeepers’ preference for a female candidate, we examined potential direct effects of the gatekeeper’s gender identity (as a woman or man) and gender bias (i.e., path $b$ and path $e$, respectively, in Figure 1). To the extent that role demands are strong (Biddle, 1979; Eagly, 1987; Stryker, 2008), they are likely to be equally salient for gatekeepers in role-relevant contexts regardless of their own attitudes and social identities. Thus, we expected that these individual difference variables would have an effect on gatekeeper’s decisions, consistent with past investigations (Hoyt, 2012; Koch et al., 2015), but that those effects would be separate from any effect of third-party prejudice. We examined these individual difference effects in our studies, testing path $b$ and path $e$ in Figure 1 by including participant gender in all analyses, and by measuring participants’ gender ideology (Study 5) and endorsement of gender stereotypes (Study 6).

To help elucidate the underlying processes further, we investigated participants’ (a) sense of freedom when making a decision, and (b) their affective responses associated with third-party prejudice accommodation effects. If, as we propose, participants feel as though they must accommodate third-party prejudice due to their role responsibilities, then such perceived duty might manifest in a reduced sense of freedom to hire a woman when there are cues to suggest that a relevant third party might be biased against women (Hypothesis 3), a possibility that we tested in Study 5. Moreover, to the extent that gatekeepers accommodate third-party prejudice in the service of meeting role demands, but in ways that do not necessarily reflect their own views and beliefs, feelings of guilt may arise as a result of this discrepancy (Monteith, Devine, & Zuwerink, 1993). Thus, we hypothesized that participants would feel guilty after accommodating prejudice (Hypothesis 4), a prediction that we tested in both Studies 4 and 5, and which is represented by path $f$ in Figure 1. This effect might be particularly strong in participants who have internalized egalitarian values to avoid behaving in a sexist manner (Klonis, Plant, & Devine, 2005), as represented by path $g$, a possibility we examined in Study 5.

In addition to testing the hypotheses we derived directly from role theory, we explored two other potential effects suggested by work on social influence processes. First, in addition to meeting role demands, to the degree that informational social influence processes are operating (Cialdini, Kallgren, & Reno, 1991), it is possible that participants may accommodate the perceived prejudices of a relevant third party in part because they believe that the views of the third party reflect valuable domain-specific experience that ought to be taken into consideration (Wood, 2000). We examined this idea by testing whether learning about a third party’s traditional view of women might increase participants’ own endorsement of gender stereotypes, and whether such an increase might partly explain their hiring selections (Study 6). Second, it seems conceivable that, in addition to a motivation to meet role demands, the desire to affiliate with others might increase the tendency to accommodate their biases. Such effect would be consistent with past work showing that normative influence, which involves motivations to seek approval or avoid disapproval from others, operates more strongly among people who have a greater desire to affiliate with the potential source of influence (Sinclair, Lowery, Hardin, & Colangelo, 2005). We examined this possibility in Study 7 by testing whether participants with a stronger desire to affiliate with the third party would display a stronger third-party prejudice accommodation effect.

We close our investigation with an internal meta-analysis, which compiled the experimental evidence to establish the robustness of the phenomenon in line with past recommendations (e.g., Goh, Hall, & Rosenthal, 2016). In all studies, results were never examined until data collection was complete, and we report all measures, manipulations, and exclusions. We report sensitivity power analysis for all studies, which were performed using G*Power 3.1 software (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007).

**Study 1**

The goal of Study 1 was to test the prediction that individuals in a gatekeeper role would display lower preference for a female candidate over a comparably qualified male candidate when there were cues to suggest that a relevant third party might be prejudiced against women, compared with when no such cues were available (Hypothesis 1, path $a$ in Figure 1). We asked participants to imagine that they worked at a recruitment agency and had to make a hiring selection for a company in the technology sector, where women are greatly underrepresented (Wang & Degol, 2017), in a condition in which there were cues to third-party prejudice against women (vs. no cues). We focused on the technology industry because bias against women is particularly strong in fields that are dominated by men (Eagly, Karau, & Makhijani, 1995) and, as such, third-party prejudice accommodation may be of particular practical import in such contexts.

In addition to testing Hypothesis 1, we also examined the potential direct effect of participant gender (consistent with path $b$ in Figure 1) by comparing the responses of male and female participants. Even though women tend to show a higher preference than men for hiring female candidates (Koch et al., 2015), the role demands to hire someone who will get along well with others (i.e., interpersonal concerns) and complete tasks successfully (task-focused concerns) are likely to be equally salient for gatekeepers.
Despite individual differences such as social identity (Biddle, 1979; Eagly, 1987; Stryker, 2008). Thus, when there were cues to suggest that a relevant third party was prejudiced against women, this prejudice cue was expected to influence participant responses separately from any potential effect of participant gender.

To test the generalizability of our findings, Study 1 included two samples: One was a laboratory sample composed primarily of students, and the other sample was composed of individuals who participated via Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), which allows for fast and inexpensive high-quality data collection (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011).

**Method**

Participants. Two-hundred and 72 participants completed the study in the lab, including undergraduate and graduate students (64%), as well as employees (36%) at a private university in the Northeast. We excluded nine participants (3.3%) because they did not attend to the material presented to them and/or indicated that their answers were random or meant as jokes. The final sample for analysis resulted in \( n = 263 \) laboratory participants (mean age = 28.36, \( SD = 10.53 \); 61.9% female; 48.5% White). One (0.4%) did not indicate gender.

Additionally, 261 individuals completed the study online via MTurk. Two (0.8%) indicated that some of their answers were meant as jokes or were random, and were excluded from analysis, resulting in \( n = 259 \) online participants (mean age = 32.33, \( SD = 10.80 \); 50.6% female; 76.4% White).

The overall analytic sample was \( n = 522 \) (50.4% laboratory; mean age = 30.31, \( SD = 10.81 \); 56.1% female; 62.5% White). A sensitivity power analysis using G*Power 3.1 (Faul et al., 2007) showed that a two-way analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) model with \( n = 522 \) and with prejudice cues condition and participant gender as factors, including three covariates described below, is sufficient to detect a small effect (i.e., \( f = .12 \); \( d = .24 \)) with power = .80 (assuming \( \alpha = .05 \)). Furthermore, a logistic regression model on a sample of this size with three predictors (Faul et al., 2009) is sufficient to detect a small effect (i.e., \( OR = .73 \); \( d = .17 \)) with power = .80, assuming \( \alpha = .05 \) (two-tailed test).

Procedure. Participants read a short vignette in which they were asked to select a vice-president (VP) of operations for a technology company. The VP of operations would report to a male chief executive officer (CEO), who was the “third party.” The vignette along with the manipulation of cues to third-party prejudice is reported in full in the Appendix. Half of participants in both samples were randomly assigned to an experimental condition in which the CEO was said to endorse beliefs that have been shown to be indicative of prejudice against women. Specifically, we adapted a procedure employed in previous research (Stroebe, Dovidio, Barreto, Ellemers, & John, 2011; Wang, Stroebe, & Dovidio, 2012), which led to inferences of prejudice by varying information about the background and gender-related beliefs of a person making a hiring decision (e.g., “It is important for women to put families before careers,” and “Positions with the most career promise should be given to individuals who are less likely to be distracted by their family life”). The other half of the participants, who were in the control condition, only learned details about the CEO’s education and background, but received no cues to suggest that the CEO might be prejudiced against women.

After reading the vignette, participants were shown a lineup of three candidate profiles, which included two strong candidates and a third candidate who was comparatively unqualified (i.e., a foil). This foil had three purposes: (a) disguising the relevance of candidate gender; (b) enhancing the realism of the task; and (c) identifying inattentive participants. The profiles contained information regarding each candidate’s previous position (i.e., “tech industry,” “auto industry”), experience in management and manufacturing (e.g., 7 years), and degree (e.g., MBA, BA). We counterbalanced (a) which of the two strong candidates was a man and which was a woman; (b) whether the foil was a man or a woman; and (c) the order in which the three candidates were presented. We conveyed candidate gender using first names as in prior research (“Karen R.” or “Brian N.”) for the strong candidates; “Ann S.” or “John S.” for the foil; Okimoto & Brescoll, 2010). The profiles also included a box ostensibly reserved for a photo, showing a male/female silhouette with the notice “Image not available.”

As can be seen in Table 1, which presents the full set of choices across conditions, participants overwhelmingly selected one of the two “strong” candidates, whereas only five selected the foil (all in the laboratory sample and 1.0% of the total sample). This pattern of selections suggests that, as intended, the foil was perceived as being comparatively less qualified than the other two candidates. We did not analyze any of the data pertaining to the foil, and we excluded the five participants who selected the foil for the job. Moreover, as can be seen in Table 1, although one of the “strong” profiles was selected more frequently than the other (irrespective of the candidates’ gender, which was randomized), this was true across conditions.

Before making a final selection, participants were asked to make all pairwise comparison ratings among the three possible candidate pairs (i.e., Karen–Brian, Karen–foil, Brian–foil), with the ratings for the two strongly and comparably qualified female and male candidates (Karen and Brian) of direct relevance to our hypotheses. For each of the three possible candidate pairs, participants were asked to indicate their preference (e.g., “Between Brian N. and Karen R., who would you select?”) on a scale from 1 (e.g., “definitely select Brian N.”) to 9 (e.g., “definitely select Karen R.”). We did not analyze the comparisons involving the foil. After making the three comparisons, participants made a final decision to select one out of the three candidates.

In all seven studies, prior to debriefing, we asked participants, with assurance that they would still be compensated, to indicate whether any of their answers were random or meant as jokes (“yes” or “no”). The study concluded with demographic questions (e.g., age, gender) and debriefing.

\(^1\) Unexpectedly, which of the two strong candidates was male or female had a significant effect on preference for the female versus the male candidate, \( F(1, 511) = 18.55, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .035 \). Participants preferred the female candidate more when she was an MS in engineering with 12 years of experience in management and 5 in manufacturing (\( M = 5.71, SE = .15 \)), compared with when she was an MBA with 10 years of experience in management and 7 in manufacturing (\( M = 4.80, SE = .15 \)). However, the candidates’ qualifications did not interact with third-party prejudice condition, \( F(1, 511) = 2.39, p = .123, \eta^2_p = .005 \), and there was no significant three-way interaction with participant gender, \( F(1, 511) = .002, p = .965, \eta^2_p < .001 \).
We conducted an ANCOVA to test the effect of prejudice cues condition (third-party prejudice cues vs. control), participant gender, and their interaction on preference between the “strong” male and female candidates. As mentioned earlier, we counterbalanced three features of the candidate lineup: (a) which of the two strong candidates was a man and which was a woman; (b) foil gender; and (c) candidate order. We included these counterbalancing factors as covariates in the analysis.2

We first conducted the analysis including sample (online vs. lab) as a factor. Overall, preference for a female candidate was higher in participants who came to the laboratory ($M = 5.52$, $SE = .16$) compared with the sample that participated online ($M = 5.02$, $SE = .15$), $F(1, 510) = 5.13, p = .024, \eta^2_g = .010$. However, there was no interaction with prejudice cues condition, $F(1, 510) = 1.75, p = .186, \eta^2_g = .003$, or participant gender, $F(1, 510) = .003, p = .953, \eta^2_g < .001$, and the three-way interaction was not significant either, $F(1, 510) = .31, p = .576, \eta^2_g = .001$. Thus, we collapsed all data across the two samples.3

Consistent with Hypothesis 1, there was a significant main effect of prejudice cues condition, $F(1, 514) = 19.48, p < .001$, $\eta^2_g = .037$: Participant preference for the female candidate was lower in the third-party prejudice cues condition ($M = 4.83, SD = 2.66$) compared with the control condition ($M = 5.73, SD = 2.33$), $M_{10} = -.96, SE = .22$, 95% confidence interval (CI) [-1.388, -.533]. There was a significant preference for a female over a male candidate in the control condition, represented by a mean significantly higher than the midpoint 5 (which indicated no preference for one candidate over the other), $t(257) = 5.05, p < .001, d = .31$. There was a nonsignificant difference between the mean, which reflected a slight preference for the male candidate, and the scale midpoint in the third-party prejudice cues condition, $t(262) = -.98, p = .320, d = -.06$.

Although preference for the female relative to the male candidate tended to be higher among female participants ($M = 5.44, SD = 2.57$) compared with male participants ($M = 5.07, SD = 2.49$), the ANCOVA revealed that this difference was not statistically significant, $F(1, 514) = 3.23, p = .073, \eta^2_g = .006$. The interaction between participant gender and prejudice cues condition was not significant either, $F(1, 514) = .97, p = .325, \eta^2_g = .002$.

We then analyzed participants’ final selection. We employed binary logistic regression to test whether prejudice cues condition (0 = control, 1 = third-party prejudice cues) predicted selection of a female candidate or a male candidate including participant gender (0 = male, 1 = female) and the interaction term in the model, as well as the same covariates as in the previous analysis.4 We first conducted the analysis including sample (online vs. lab) as a factor, but it did not directly impact selections, $b = .06, SE = .38, p = .874, OR = 1.063$, or interact with prejudice cues condition or gender, all $p$s > .361. Therefore, we collapsed all data across the two samples.5 As expected, there was a significant main effect of prejudice cues condition on the choice between a male candidate and an equally qualified female candidate, $b = -.98, SE = .28, p < .001, OR = .98, 95% CI [.490, 1.370]$. As expected, the female candidate was significantly less likely to be selected in the third-party prejudice cues condition (42.6%) compared with the control condition (57.4%), whereas the male candidate was more likely to be selected (59.8% vs. 40.2%). Participants in the control condition showed a significant preference for a female over a male candidate, represented by a selection rate significantly higher than 50%, $\chi^2(1, N = 259) = 17.33, p < .001, d = .53$. In the third-party prejudice cues condition, selection of a female candidate fell to chance level, and was not significantly different from 50%, $\chi^2(1, N = 263) = 2.01, p = .156, d = .17$.

There was no significant effect of participant gender, $b = -.20, SE = .26, p = .446, OR = .819, 95% CI [.490, 1.370]$, and no significant interaction between participant gender and prejudice cues condition, $b = .45, SE = .37, p = .221, OR = 1.568, 95% CI [.763, 3.220]$.  

### Discussion

As expected, this study provided evidence that people in roles in charge of hiring accommodate the perceived gender-based prejudice of relevant third parties in their selections, resulting in less preference for and a less likely final selection of female candidates. This result, which shows accommodation of others’ presumed prejudices in the absence of an explicit request, complements work in the tradition of normative influence and obedience to authority that shows how people sometimes engage in discrimination to obey authority figures and avoid punishment (e.g., Brief et al., 1995, 2000). Consistent with the notion that, when role demands are clearly specified (as they were in this study), individuals are likely to behave in line with those demands in addition to the potential direct effects of their social category group memberships

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2 When these covariates were omitted, the main effect of prejudice cues condition remained significant, $F(1, 517) = 18.28, p < .001, \eta^2_g = .034$.

3 Results were no different when we included sample type as a covariate. Similarly, student status did not moderate the effect of prejudice cues, $F(1, 506) = 2.06, p = .129, \eta^2_g = .008$. Furthermore, the effect of prejudice cues remained significant when adjusting for participant race and age, $F(1, 512) = 18.02, p < .001, \eta^2_g = .034$.

4 When these covariates were omitted, the main effect of prejudice cues condition was significant, $b = -.92, SE = .27, p = .001, OR = .400$.

5 Results were no different when we included sample type as a covariate. Similarly, student status did not moderate the effect of prejudice cues, $b = .31, SE = .42, p = .470, OR = 1.358$. Moreover, the effect of prejudice cues remained significant when adjusting for participant race and age, $b = -.97, SE = .28, p < .001, OR = .377$.  

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### Table 1

**Full Set of Participant Choices in Study 1 by Condition and Candidate Gender**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Control</th>
<th>Third-party prejudice</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participant selections</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profile 1 (total)</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profile 1 (Karen)</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profile 1 (Brian)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profile 2 (total)</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profile 2 (Karen)</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profile 2 (Brian)</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foil (total)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foil (Ann)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foil (John)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>527</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(Biddle, 1979; Eagly, 1987), both men and women accommodated third-party prejudice against women.

We found, as expected, that preference for and final selection of a female relative to an equivalently qualified male candidate for a technology job was lower when there were cues to gender bias in a relevant third party compared with when no such cues were present. Participants in the control condition actually showed both a significant preference for and were more likely to select a female candidate over a male candidate. In general, people may be aware of the underrepresentation of women in the technology sector (Wang & Degol, 2017), which is often discussed in popular media (Smiley, 2018; Tan, 2018). It is possible that participants sought to counter these gender imbalances in the absence of cues to third-party prejudice. However, consistent with our predictions, when there were cues to prejudice against women (which provided a role-related reason to favor a male over a female candidate), the preference for and higher selection of the female candidate that we observed in the control condition was eliminated.

In Study 1, we were able to generalize the third-party prejudice effect in which people accommodate the biases of others to laboratory and online settings and found that student status did not moderate the effect. But the study entailed hypothetical rather than actual selections, a limitation we address in Study 2 by testing the phenomenon of interest in a context in which participant decisions had practical consequences. Moreover, Study 1 focused on hiring decisions in a masculine domain, and the results might not generalize to other kinds of contexts. In Study 2, we further examined the accommodation of third-party prejudice against women in a gender-neutral setting.

### Study 2

This study was a conceptual replication of Study 1, testing path a in Figure 1 using a substantially different operationalization of the dependent variable. Specifically, rather than being in a role in charge of hiring decisions, participants in Study 2 were in charge of coordinating others to work together—a situation in which similar interpersonal and task-focused concerns may arise, motivating prejudice accommodation. We asked participants to coordinate other people to play a game for cash rewards with the ultimate goal of raising funds for charity. From a role theory perspective, participants placed in a position of responsibility for raising funds for a worthy cause would be expected to look for opportunities to make decisions that would maximize fundraising and avoid decisions that could jeopardize it.

Participants in Study 2, who were assigned the role of raising funds for charity, first became personally acquainted with an exchange activity modeled after the ultimatum game (Gäth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982), in which people made and accepted offers for financial rewards. In the ultimatum game, two players have the task of dividing a sum of money between them. One of the players (the “proposer”) makes an offer to divide the money, which the other player (the “respondent”) may either accept or reject. If the offer is accepted, the money is split; if it is rejected, neither player receives money.

In our modification of this classic paradigm, participants first became personally acquainted with the game by participating in preliminary rounds. In the critical last round of the game, participants learned about the person who would be assigned the position of “proposer” (the third party). Analogous to the conditions in Study 1, participants witnessed the proposer make a negative comment about the intelligence of women (third-party prejudice cues) or make another negative comment unrelated to gender (control condition). Participants were then asked to select a man or woman as the “respondent” in the round, and learned that they would receive the same amount of money earned by the respondent, which would be donated to a charity. This feature of the procedure allowed us to test the accommodation of third-party prejudice in a context in which participant choices had real rather than hypothetical consequences, complementing Study 1. The most direct way for the participant to attempt to influence their payoff in the critical round would be to select a respondent likely to receive a high offer from the proposer.

Although operationally quite different from the hiring paradigm we used in Study 1, the situation in Study 2 was conceptually similar in that it put participants in a specific role (raising funds for charity) that depended on the smooth coordination of other people, in some cases one of which was prejudiced. Previous research has found that exchanges in the ultimatum game are more likely to be rejected when one player is biased against the other player’s social group (Kubota, Bar-David, Banaji, & Phelps, 2013) and, more generally, that people expect others who are prejudiced against a particular group to act in an exploitative and unfair way toward members of that group (Sommers & Norton, 2006). Thus, in the condition in which there were cues suggesting that the proposer was prejudiced against women (vs. no cues), we expected participants to surmise that a female respondent might receive a lower offer from the proposer compared to a male respondent. To the extent that participants believe that fairer offers are more likely to be accepted in the ultimatum game (Rand, Tarnita, Ohtsuki, & Nowak, 2013) and, as their role dictates, are motivated to maximize contributions to charity (which are tied to the responders’ earnings), participants may be less likely to select a woman as a responder when the proposer appears to be prejudiced than when there are no signals of his bias. Therefore, we predicted, in line with Hypothesis 1, that participants would be significantly less likely to select a woman to interact with another individual with the purpose of raising funds for charity when there were cues suggesting that this individual was prejudiced against women (vs. no cues).

Whereas Study 1 used a context, hiring in a technology company, in which gender issues were likely salient, the situation present in Study 2 was less overtly gender-related. In this context, we also compared the responses of male and female participants in order to examine the potential direct effect of participant gender (consistent with path b in Figure 1), in which male and female participants may generally favor a person of their own gender in their selection of the respondent (Greenwald & Pettigrew, 2014; Koch et al., 2015). Such participant gender effect might operate separately from the effect of cues to third-party prejudice, given that, as we explained earlier, role demands and expectations (Biddle, 1979; Eagly, 1987; Stryker, 2008) are presumed to operate independently of group-based (or personal) biases.

### Method

**Participants.** In total, 271 participants completed the study on MTurk. We excluded 16 participants (5.9%) who indicated that
their answers were random or meant as jokes. The final sample for analysis resulted in $n = 255$ (mean age = 20.11, $SD = 11.38$; 62.0% female; 76.9% White). A sensitivity power analysis using G*Power 3.1 (Faul et al., 2009) showed a logistic regression model on a sample of this size ($n = 255$) with three predictors is sufficient to detect a small effect (i.e., $OR = .64; d = .25$) with power = .80, assuming $\alpha = .05$ (two-tailed test).

Procedure. We employed a modified version of the ultimatum game (Güth et al., 1982), which we presented as a game in which participants would play as well as select others to play for them with the goal of raising funds for charity. As with the traditional ultimatum game, one person was assigned to be the proposer, and another person was designated as the responder. In each round, the proposer was asked to determine how a pool of money, $0.50 in the present study, should be split across the two players. If the responder accepted the split, the proposer and the responder would receive the amounts of money specified by the proposer. If the responder did not accept the proposed split, neither player would earn any money on that round. There were four rounds in the present study, all of which allowed the participant to raise funds for charity. The instructions for each round are included in the online supplemental materials.

A key aspect of our procedure was in defining the role of participants in a unique way in the session, one in which their primary responsibility was to raise funds for charity. In order to promote participants’ commitment to raising funds, after being instructed about the nature of the game and the role they occupied, we asked participants to select one out of three equivalently popular charities (based on a pretest, described in the online supplemental materials, with 151 MTurk workers) as the beneficiary in the session: The Humane Society (i.e., animal welfare), Boys & Girls Clubs (children welfare), and Doctors Without Borders (health care). On each round, participants in our study received an amount of money to donate to charity that was equivalent to the amount earned by the responder (whether or not the participant was directly in the role of the responder).

In order to make the situation appear realistic and involving, we first asked participants to create a personal profile by selecting an avatar and indicating their first name or an alias, their age, state of residence, favorite food (open ended), and hobby (open ended). We also asked them to provide a short answer to the question “What are the best and the worst people to work with?” For each round, participants were presented with a grid of six profiles (three men and three women in random order) from which they had to select players for that round of the game. The roster of players represented by the profiles changed for each round of the game. The gender of the players was conveyed with first names and avatars. Upon selecting a player, the screen showed this person’s profile, including their responses to the three open-ended questions, resembling the information provided by participants in their own profiles, as well as (bogus) records of past performance. These performance records showed the last few offers that a player had made or accepted along with the first name of the person with whom they had played.

In the first two rounds of the game, to acquaint them directly with the procedure, participants selected another player from the roster of six other “participants.” In Rounds 1 and 2, participants were designated to be the responder, ostensibly randomly, and could either accept or reject the proposer’s offers ($0.15 on Round 1 and $0.20 on Round 2). Round 3 was slightly different: Participants selected two players who would then be (ostensibly) randomly assigned to the roles of proposer and responder to play the ultimatum game together. Although the participant would not play on Round 3 and was instead in charge of coordinating others to play, the participant would earn the same reward as the responder (or no reward if the responder rejected the proposer’s offer). We included Round 3 to provide participants with experience selecting two other people to play the game. Regardless of whom they selected, the proposer was preprogrammed to offer the responder $0.15, and the responder accepted the offer. The participant thus earned $0.15 for charity on Round 3.

The focus of Study 2 was in the behavior of participants in Round 4. In Round 4, unlike Round 3, participants learned that the proposer had been preselected, and that their task would be to choose another person as a responder from a roster of six other players (three men and three women). In both prejudice cues conditions (third-party prejudice cues and no-cues control), the preselected individual who would be the proposer was a man. What differed between the conditions was the comment offered by the proposer in his profile and the history of past offers to other players whose names suggested that they were men or women. In response to the open-ended profile question about who are the best and the worst people to work with, the proposer in the third-party prejudice cues condition ostensibly answered: “Smart people are the best people to work with. Worst of all is working with women because they are not always smart and they complain too much.” In contrast, in the control (i.e., no cues) condition, the proposer answered: “Smart people are the best people to work with. Worst of all is working with people who complain too much.”

We also manipulated the proposer’s past performance records, which listed the last five offers he had made as a proposer next to the names of the respective responders (three female names, e.g., “Sonia,” and two male names, e.g., “Mark”). In the third-party prejudice cues condition, the offers made to female responders were low (e.g., $0.05), whereas those made to male responders were comparatively high (e.g., $0.25), denoting a bias in favor of male responders. In the control condition, in which there were no cues indicative of prejudice, the proposer’s past performance was mixed and evinced no clear pattern of bias, with some female responders receiving high offers and some male responders receiving low offers. The main outcome of interest in Study 2 was whether participants selected a man or a woman to be the responder on Round 4.

As a manipulation check, after making their selection, participants were asked how much they agreed with the following statement: “Player 1 (the proposer) is biased against women,” from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). The game was then interrupted, and basic demographic questions (e.g., race/ethnicity) and a debriefing letter followed. We computed the total cash rewards accrued by participants and donated the funds to their chosen charity, as stipulated in the cover story.

Results

As intended, participants in the third-party prejudice cues condition rated the proposer as significantly more biased against women ($M = 4.14, SD = 1.74$) compared with those in the control
higher than 50%, was a significant preference for a female over a male candidate in men) compared with the control condition, in which such cues responder in the condition in which the proposer (i.e., the third parties as a way to meet role demands—a proposed mechanism that we tested directly in the two studies that follow.

In line with Hypothesis 1, participants were significantly less likely to choose a female player over a male player to be the responder in the condition in which the proposer (i.e., the third-party prejudice, which suggests that perhaps they saw the role of responder in the ultimatum game as particularly suitable for women (contrary to a male-dominated context, in which they might assume the opposite; Eagly & Karau, 2002). For example, drawing on gender stereotypes that women are generally less assertive and more socially accommodating than are men (Koenig, Eagly, Mitchell, & Ristikari, 2011), participants may assume that a female responder will accept low offers rather than reject them (which would increase fundraising relative to a responder who was more demanding). And yet, participants were less likely to select a female responder when there were cues that a relevant third party was prejudiced against women.

In the binary logistic regression, there was no significant main effect of participant gender, \( b = -0.19, SE = 0.27, p = 0.483, OR = 0.828, 95\% CI [0.498, 1.404] \), and there was no significant interaction between participant gender and prejudice cues condition, \( b = 0.49, SE = 0.36, p = 0.192, OR = 1.633, 95\% CI [0.570, 4.678] \).

Discussion

We found, as expected, that participants accommodated the perceived prejudice of a relevant third party in their selection process (Hypothesis 1), replicating Study 1 using a different operationalization of the dependent variable and a more gender-neutral setting. In Study 2, participants were more likely to select a female player than a male player in the absence of cues to third-party prejudice, which suggests that perhaps they saw the role of responder in the ultimatum game as particularly suitable for women (contrary to a male-dominated context, in which they might assume the opposite; Eagly & Karau, 2002). For example, drawing on gender stereotypes that women are generally less assertive and more socially accommodating than are men (Koenig, Eagly, Mitchell, & Ristikari, 2011), participants may assume that a female responder will accept low offers rather than reject them (which would increase fundraising relative to a responder who was more demanding). And yet, participants were less likely to select a female responder when there were cues that a relevant third party (the proposer in the game) was prejudiced against women (vs. no cues).

We found no direct effect of participant gender in this study and, as in Study 1, both men and women accommodated prejudice against women in their player selections, which is to be expected when role demands are strong (Biddle, 1979; Eagly, 1987; Stryker, 2008) as they were for participants across conditions. These results are consistent with our rationale that people accommodate biased third parties as a way to meet role demands—a proposed mechanism that we tested directly in the two studies that follow.

Study 3

The goal of the next two studies, Studies 3 and 4, was to provide evidence that gatekeepers accommodate third-party prejudice (Hypothesis 1) due to interpersonal and/or task-focused concerns that are consistent with the gatekeeper role (Hypothesis 2, i.e., path c and path d in Figure 1). When making a hiring decision, gatekeepers may prioritize interpersonal concerns focused on avoiding conflict or facilitating relations among the parties involved, as well as task-focused concerns centered on “getting the job done” (Vi- anen, 2000). We propose that these concerns would thereby lead gatekeepers to accommodate the biases of a third party in order to avoid conflict in relations and task-related problems that would likely occur if the gatekeeper introduced a member of the target of prejudice into an organization. Study 3 used a paradigm similar to Study 1 in which we manipulated third-party prejudice cues (vs. no cues) and investigated these ideas by measuring task-focused and interpersonal concerns as mediators of third-party prejudice accommodation. To test the generalizability of third-party prejudice accommodation effects, we included two different contexts, the hiring scenario used in Study 1 and a scenario involving the selection of an international conflict negotiator. We also examined the direct effect of participant gender on preference for a female candidate (Koch et al., 2015). Given that role demands tend to be equally salient regardless of individual differences (Biddle, 1979; Eagly, 1987; Stryker, 2008), we expected that this participant gender effect may operate separately from the influence of cues to third-party prejudice against women.

Method

Participants. In total, 418 individuals in an MTurk sample (mean age = 32.27, SD = 10.68; 56.1% female; 71.5% White) participated online. No participants were excluded. Nine participants (2.1%) did not indicate their gender. Sensitivity power analysis showed a two-way multiple analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) on a sample of this size (n = 418) with prejudice cues condition and participant gender as factors including one covariate described below and three response variables is sufficient to detect a small effect (i.e., \( f^2 = .014; d = .24 \)) with power = .80 and \( \alpha = .05 \).

Procedure. Half of the participants were assigned either to a condition in which there were cues suggesting third-party prejudice against women or to a control condition in which such prejudice cues were absent, in the context of one of two vignettes (i.e., Scenarios 1 and 2). Scenario 1 was identical to the one we used in Study 1: Participants who read this scenario were asked to select a vice president of operations for a tech company who would report directly to the company CEO, either in a condition in which the CEO was described as holding beliefs indicative of prejudice against women (Stroebel et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2012) or in a condition in which the CEO was described in general terms with no cues that he might be biased. Participants who read Scenario 2 were asked to select either a male or female chief negotiator to oversee truce talks between two countries engaged in military conflict. The chief negotiator would be tasked with mediating between the leaders of the two warring countries, who represented the third party in this scenario. We conveyed third-party prejudice by providing information about gender inequality in the two countries (e.g., “In Country A and Country B, women are often dis-
categorized against.”) The full scenario and prejudice cues manipulation is presented in the online supplemental materials.

Across Scenario 1 and Scenario 2, after reading the vignette, participants were asked “All other things being equal (e.g., personality traits, professional experience, etc.), who would you select, a man or a woman?” from 1 (definitely select a man) to 9 (definitely select a woman). We present results collapsed across the two scenarios, but correlations between this variable and all others in the study, including preference for a female candidate, appear in Table 2.

After indicating their preference to select a female or a male candidate, participants were asked to rate two items on a Likert-type scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). One item measured interpersonal concerns: “(The CEO/The two countries) would be displeased if you (selected/appointed) a female (VP of operations/chief negotiator),” and one item measured task-focused concerns: “In this context, a female (VP of operations/chief negotiator) would be more likely to fail relative to an identical male.” These two items were presented together, in random order. Seven participants (1.7%) did not provide responses to these two questions. Basic demographic questions (e.g., age, gender, race/ethnicity) and a debriefing followed.

Results

Means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations are presented in Table 2. Given our predictions that third-party prejudice cues (vs. no cues) would reduce preference to hire a female candidate (Hypothesis 1) because it would increase interpersonal and task-focused concerns about hiring a woman (Hypothesis 2), we performed a 2 (Prejudice Cues Condition: third-party prejudice cues vs. no cues) × 2 (Participant Gender: male vs. female) MANCOVA on (a) preference for a female candidate, (b) interpersonal concerns, and (c) task-focused concerns, adjusting for the specific vignette scenario. Analyses revealed a significant main effect of cues to third-party prejudice for the three outcome variables.

Supporting Hypothesis 1, there was a significant main effect of prejudice cues condition, $F(1, 404) = 37.86, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .086$: Participants showed lower preference to select a female candidate when there were cues to third-party prejudice against women ($M = 3.31, SD = 2.13$) compared with the control condition ($M = 4.42, SD = 1.69$), $M_{p} = -1.17, SE = .19, 95\% CI [-1.539, -.794]$. In both prejudice cues conditions, participants exhibited a significant preference for a male over a female candidate, represented by a mean significantly lower than five (which indicated no preference for one candidate over the other) in the control (i.e., no cues) condition, $t(203) = -4.89, p < .001, d = -.34$, and in the third-party prejudice cues condition, $t(204) = -11.35, p < .001, d = -.79$. In line with path b in the model, there was a significant main effect of participant gender on preference for a female candidate, $F(1, 404) = 5.99, p = .015, \eta^2_p = .015$, such that female participants showed stronger preference to hire a woman ($M = 4.04, SD = 2.10$) compared with male participants ($M = 3.64, SD = 1.85$), $M_{p} = .46, SE = .19, 95\% CI [.091, .836]$. There was no significant interaction between prejudice cues condition and participant gender on preference for a female candidate, $F(1, 404) = .65, p = .421, \eta^2_p = .002$.

In line with Hypothesis 2, there was also a significant main effect of condition on interpersonal concerns, $F(1, 404) = 129.83, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .243$, and on task-focused concerns, $F(1, 404) = 48.96, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .128$. When there were cues to third-party prejudice against women, participants reported stronger interpersonal concerns ($M = 4.05, SD = .93$) compared with the control condition ($M = 2.96, SD = 1.04$), $M_{p} = 1.10, SE = .10, 95\% CI [.909, 1.289]$. Similarly, they reported stronger task-focused concerns when there were cues to third-party prejudice against women ($M = 3.13, SD = 1.27$) compared with the control condition ($M = 2.33, SD = 1.22$), $M_{p} = .84, SE = .12, 95\% CI [.603, 1.075]$. For interpersonal concerns and task-focused concerns, there were no main effects of gender and no interactions, all $ps > .124$.

To further test Hypothesis 2 that role-relevant concerns underlie the tendency to accommodate third-party prejudice, we used Model 4 in the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2013) to conduct a mediation analysis with 10,000 bootstraps (95\% bias corrected). We entered preference for a female candidate as outcome, prejudice cues condition as the predictor (0 = control, 1 = third-party prejudice cues), and the two concerns as parallel mediators, with scenario and participant gender as covariates.\(^6\) These indirect effects are plotted in Figure 2. As expected, interpersonal concerns significantly mediated the effect of prejudice cues condition on preference for a female candidate, $b = -.38, SE = .11, 95\% CI [-.628, -.172]$, and so did task-focused concerns, $b = -.49, SE = .10, 95\% CI [-.723, -.326]$.\(^6\)

Discussion

The results of Study 3 replicated the third-party prejudice effect, showing that participants were less likely, in two different contexts, to choose a female over a male candidate when there were cues that a relevant third party was prejudiced than when such cues were absent (Hypothesis 1). Moreover, Study 3 extends our previous findings by supporting Hypothesis 2 that gatekeepers accommodate third-party prejudice in their selection process due to the demands of the gatekeeper role (i.e., to hire someone who will work well with existing organizational members and excel at the job). Interpersonal and task-focused concerns were greater when there were cues indicating that the third party was prejudiced against women than when these cues were absent, and there were significant indirect effects of the prejudice cues manipulation on the preference to select a male over a female candidate through both greater interpersonal and task-focused concerns. Also, as anticipated, female participants displayed a greater preference for female candidates than did male participants, and this effect occurred independently from the effect of the third-party prejudice cues manipulation.

Study 4

Whereas Study 3 provided evidence that supported the hypothesized mediating roles of task-focused and interpersonal concerns on the effect of the manipulation of third-party prejudice cues on preferences for female or male candidates (Hypothesis 2), statistical mediation involving measured variables does not definitively

\(^6\) When these two covariates were omitted, the two mediation effects remained significant.
identify the direction of causality between the mediator and the dependent variable (Bullock, Green, & Ha, 2010; MacKinnon, Fairchild, & Fritz, 2007). Thus, as recommended by Spencer, Zanna, and Fong (2005), in Study 4 we tested Hypothesis 2 by experimentally affecting task-focused concerns. Besides manipulating prejudice cues (third-party prejudice cues vs. no cues) and including participant gender as a factor, we also varied whether no additional information was provided about the likelihood of success for the candidates (comparable with our previous studies) or included information that both candidates were extremely likely (95% chance) to succeed at the task. A key assumption in the previous studies is that gatekeepers accommodate the biases of a third party because they are concerned about increasing the likelihood that a candidate will succeed in the position. According to this line of reasoning, when successful task completion is virtually guaranteed (vs. not), hiring a woman would be less incompatible with role demands regardless of the attitudes of the relevant third party. Thus, from a role perspective, we hypothesized that less accommodation of third-party prejudice would occur in this condition compared with when success was not virtually guaranteed.

Moreover, in Study 4 we also investigated the affective implications of third-party prejudice accommodation, specifically testing Hypothesis 4 that people would feel guilty after accommodating others’ biases against women in the service of meeting role demands may run counter to the gatekeeper’s personal gender views and beliefs. Such a discrepancy between personal standards and behavior is associated with feelings of regret (Monteith et al., 1993). We tested Hypothesis 4 by measuring participants’ self-reported affective reactions after expressing their preference for a female/male candidate. We also tested and expected to find that the accommodation of prejudice would mediate these affective responses. That is, to the extent that participants accommodated the perceived prejudice of a third party more, we anticipated that they would feel guiltier as a consequence.

**Method**

**Participants.** In Study 4, 617 individuals participated on MTurk. We excluded nine participants (1.4%) who indicated that their answers were random or meant as jokes. The final sample for analysis included an n = 608 (mean age = 31.70, SD = 10.61; 52.5% female; 74.2% White). Two participants (0.3%) did not indicate their gender. Sensitivity power analysis showed a two-way multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) on a sample of this size (n = 608) with prejudice cues condition and participant gender and three response variables sufficient to detect a small effect (i.e., $f^2 = .011; d = .21$) with power = .80 assuming $\alpha = .05$.

![Figure 2](image)

**Figure 2.** Interpersonal concerns and task-focused concerns significantly mediated the effect of condition on preference for a female candidate in Study 3.

**Table 2**

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>M (SD)</th>
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<th>3</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Prejudice cues (0 = control, 1 = third-party prejudice)</td>
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<td>2. Participant gender (0 = M, 1 = F)</td>
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<td>3. Scenario</td>
<td>—</td>
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<td>—</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Preference female candidate</td>
<td>3.86 (2.00)</td>
<td>—.28**</td>
<td>.10*</td>
<td>.13**</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Interpersonal concerns</td>
<td>3.50 (1.12)</td>
<td>.49**</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>-.17**</td>
<td>-.42**</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Task-focused concerns</td>
<td>2.73 (1.31)</td>
<td>.31**</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.24**</td>
<td>-.52**</td>
<td>.49**</td>
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*p < .05. **p < .01.
**Procedure.** All participants read the vignette from Study 3 in which they were asked to select a chief negotiator to oversee truce talks between two warring countries. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: cues to third-party prejudice against women or no cues. In addition to this manipulation, we aimed to reduce task-focused concerns experimentally by manipulating the perception that a female candidate would be successful at the job. We provided half of participants with 95% success estimates for all negotiators (described in the online supplemental materials). After the vignette, all participants indicated their hiring preference in the same way as in Scenario 2 in Study 3. We then measured task-focused concerns with three items rated from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree); e.g., “If a woman were appointed, negotiations between Countries A and B may fail;” (α = .85). We also measured interpersonal concerns with three items rated from 1 (did not consider at all) to 6 (considered a great deal); e.g., “Countries A and B may be insulted if you sent a woman as chief negotiator;” (α = .94).

Participants next indicated how much they felt the following when thinking about their decision, from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely so): ashamed, remorseful, guilty, sad, upset, and disgusted (i.e., self-directed negative affect), and happy, proud, cheerful, delighted, inspired, joyful (positive affect), presented together in random order. Principal components analysis with varimax rotation confirmed two factors, one for positive affect (α = .96) and one for self-directed negative affect (α = .92). The item “upset” did not load onto either component and was dropped from analysis. Basic demographic questions (e.g., age, gender, race/ethnicity) and debriefing followed.

**Results**

Means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations are presented in Table 3.

**Third-party prejudice accommodation.** We predicted that cues indicating third-party prejudice against women (vs. no cues) would reduce preference for a female candidate (Hypothesis 1) because it would increase interpersonal and task-focused concerns about hiring a woman (Hypothesis 2), and that providing a high success estimate for a female candidate, (b) interpersonal concerns, and (c) task-focused concerns.

Analyses revealed a significant main effect of prejudice cues condition for all outcome variables. Replicating Studies 1–3 and supporting Hypothesis 1, there was a significant main effect of prejudice cues on preference for a female candidate, $F(1, 598) = 49.07, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .076$. Participants were less likely to select a woman in the third-party prejudice cues condition ($M = 3.29, SD = 2.38$) compared with the control condition ($M = 4.52, SD = 1.96$), $M_D = -1.22, SE = .17, 95\% CI \{-1.567, - .881\}$. In both prejudice cues conditions, participants showed significantly lower preference for a female over a male candidate, represented by a mean significantly lower than five (which indicated no preference for one candidate over the other) in the control (i.e., no cues) condition, $t(299) = -4.27, p < .001, d = - .24$, and in the third-party prejudice cues condition, $t(305) = 12.53, p < .001, d = -.72$.

As in Study 3, and in line with Hypothesis 2, there were also significant main effects of prejudice cues on interpersonal concerns, $F(1, 598) = 117.03, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .164$, and task-focused concerns, $F(1, 598) = 84.30, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .124$. In the third-party prejudice cues condition, participants were more concerned about interpersonal aspects of the decision ($M = 4.74, SD = 1.28$) compared with the control condition ($M = 3.43, SD = 1.67$), $M_D = 1.31, SE = .12, 95\% CI [1.070, 1.545]$, and also reported stronger task-focused concerns ($M = 4.50, SD = 1.42$) than those in the control condition ($M = 3.48, SD = 1.43$), $M_D = 1.02, SE = .11, 95\% CI [1.084, 1.242]$. Furthermore, interpersonal concerns mediated the effect of prejudice cues condition on preference for a female candidate; $b = - .69, SE = .09, [- .884, -.526]$, and so did task-focused concerns, $b = - .39, SE = .08, [- .572, -.256]$.

As intended, there was a significant main effect of likelihood of success condition on task-focused concerns, $F(1, 598) = 52.58, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .081$, which were significantly reduced when we provided 95% success estimates for all candidates ($M = 3.60, SD = 1.53$) compared with when these estimates were not provided ($M = 4.39, SD = 1.40$), $M_D = -.81, SE = .11, 95\% CI [-1.027, -.589]$. And, as expected, there was a significant interaction between prejudice cues and likelihood of success condition on preference for a female candidate, $F(1, 598) = 10.29, p = .001, \eta^2_p = .017$, as illustrated in Figure 3. In line with Hypothesis 2, although preference for a female candidate was significantly lower when there were third-party prejudice cues (vs. no cues) in both likelihood of success conditions, the effect was substantially re-

**Table 3**

Means, Standard Deviations, and Bivariate Correlations Between Variables in Study 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>M (SD)</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Prejudice cues (0 = control, 1 = third-party prejudice)</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Participant gender (0 = M, 1 = F)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Likelihood of success (0 = control, 1 = 95%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Preference female candidate</td>
<td>3.90 (2.27)</td>
<td>.27**</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.12**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Interpersonal concerns</td>
<td>4.10 (1.62)</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.50**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Task-focused concerns</td>
<td>3.99 (1.51)</td>
<td>.34**</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.26**</td>
<td>.43**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Self-directed negative affect</td>
<td>1.70 (.90)</td>
<td>.22**</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>-.26**</td>
<td>.33**</td>
<td>.25**</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Positive affect</td>
<td>2.17 (1.16)</td>
<td>-.16**</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.18**</td>
<td>.45**</td>
<td>-.23**</td>
<td>-.32**</td>
<td>-.33**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**p < .01.
interaction between prejudice cues and likelihood of success condition, $F(1, 598) = 14.31, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .024$, such that the effect of prejudice cues condition on preference for a female candidate was significant only when 95% success estimates were not provided, $F(1, 598) = 46.23, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .077$. But as expected, providing 95% success estimates eliminated the third-party prejudice effect among female participants, $F(1, 598) = 2.13, p = .145, \eta^2_p = .003$.

Affective reactions. We performed a 2 (Prejudice Cues Condition: third-party prejudice cues vs. no cues) × 2 (Likelihood of Success: 95% vs. no information) × 2 (Participant Gender: male vs. female) MANOVA on (a) self-directed negative affect and (b) positive affect. In line with Hypothesis 4, there was a significant main effect of prejudice cues condition on self-directed negative affect, $F(1, 598) = 31.74, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .050$, which was higher when there were cues to third-party prejudice ($M = 1.89, SD = .95$) versus no cues ($M = 1.49, SD = .78$), $M_D = .40, SE = .07, 95\% \text{ CI } [.261, .539]$. In contrast, positive affect was also significantly different between prejudice cues conditions, $F(1, 598) = 16.07, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .026$, but it was lower when there were cues to third-party prejudice ($M = 1.99, SD = 1.13$) versus no cues ($M = 2.36, SD = 1.17$), $M_D = .37, SE = .09, 95\% \text{ CI } [-.550, -.188]$. In further support of Hypothesis 4, mediation analysis using Model 4 in the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2013) with 10,000 bootstraps (95% bias corrected), illustrated in Figure 4, revealed that participant hiring decisions significantly mediated the effect of prejudice cues condition on self-directed negative affect, $b = .10, SE = .02, 95\% \text{ CI } [.065, .161]$.

Discussion

Providing complementary evidence to Study 3 by manipulating one of the hypothesized mediators, task-focused concerns, directly (see Spencer et al., 2005), we found in Study 4 that providing half of participants with 95% estimates of success for all candidates significantly reduced task-focused concerns and, as a result, the accommodation of third-party prejudice compared with the control condition. These results dovetail with past investigations showing that role behavior could change significantly by merely changing the definition of the role (Pratto et al., 1999; Richeson & Ambady, 2001b) or the articulation of specific goals (Vescio, Sechrist, & Paolucci, 2003). In Study 4, this effect was particularly strong among female participants, for whom providing 95% success estimates completely eliminated the third-party prejudice effect.

Figure 3. Preference for a female candidate over a male candidate when the third party was prejudiced against women versus control in Study 4. Reducing task-focused concerns by providing 95% success estimates significantly reduced the accommodation of third-party prejudice against women. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean.

Figure 4. Preference for a female candidate significantly mediated the effect of prejudice cues condition on self-directed negative affect in Study 4.
We had not predicted the three-way interaction between participant gender, likelihood of success condition, and prejudice cues condition a priori; hence, these exploratory results must be interpreted with caution. But they are consistent with a Person × Situation approach whereby individual differences become a stronger determinant of behavior in situations that are ambiguously structured (Mischel, 2004). Accordingly, the personal preferences and social identities of those in charge of hiring may be more likely to be expressed in their decisions to accommodate (or reject) the perceived biases of others when the role demand to do so is weaker (vs. stronger), in line with a role-based account.

Overall, Studies 3 and 4 thus provide converging evidence, consistent with a role theory framework, of the mechanisms underlying the accommodation of third-party prejudice in hiring decisions. Participants reported feeling guilty after accommodating prejudice in Study 4, consistent with Hypothesis 4 and with past work indicating that enacting behavior that contradicts personal views (but which may be required to meet role demands) is typically associated with feelings of guilt and remorse (Monteith et al., 1993). We sought to replicate the affective response findings in Study 5, as well as examine the direct effect of participants’ gender ideology.

Study 5

As noted earlier, we hypothesized that, in addition to third-party prejudice accommodation effects associated with role demands, individuals’ social identity and personal biases would also, independently, affect preferences for a female candidate relative to a male candidate. Consistent with this reasoning, with respect to social identity, in both Studies 3 and 4 female participants displayed a significantly stronger preference for a female over a male candidate than did male participants. Although the results were in the expected direction, the effect for participant gender was not significant in Study 1 or Study 2. Participant gender did not moderate the effects of the third-party prejudice cue in any of our previous studies. Study 5 investigated the effects of individual differences in gender bias, as well.

In Study 5, we manipulated third-party prejudice cues in the scenario used in Studies 3 and 4 in which participants were asked to select a chief negotiator to oversee truce talks between two warring countries. We again examined the effects of the gatekeeper’s gender identity (as a woman or man), and we also assessed individual differences in gender bias (i.e., path b and path e, respectively, in Figure 1). Specifically, we measured prejudice toward women using the Modern Sexism Scale (Swim, Aikin, Hall, & Hunter, 1995), which is associated with lower preference to hire women (e.g., Moss-Racusin, Dovidio, Pugh, & Vaslow, 2000). In contrast, internal motivation to respond without sexism reflects a concern with acting consistently with personally important nonprejudiced standards that bias is wrong (e.g., “Because of my personal values, I believe that using stereotypes about women is wrong”; Klonis et al., 2005). In Study 5 we measured both external and internal motivations to respond without sexism (Moss-Racusin et al., 2005). External motivation to respond without sexism reflects a tendency to inhibit the expression of gender bias in order to avoid social disapproval (e.g., to avoid appearing prejudiced “because of today’s PC [politically correct] standards;” Klonis et al., 2005, p. 1248). In contrast, internal motivation to respond without sexism reflects a concern with acting consistently with personally important nonprejudiced standards that bias is wrong (e.g., “Because of my personal values, I believe that using stereotypes about women is wrong;” Klonis et al., 2005, p. 1248). Thus, we expected that internal (but not external) motivation to respond without sexism would moderate the extent to which participants feel guilty after accommodating prejudice, in line with path g in Figure 1.

Finally, we sought to further illuminate the processes underlying prejudice accommodation in Study 5 by investigating participants’
sense of freedom when making their decision. If participants feel as though they must accommodate third-party prejudice due to their role responsibilities, this sense of duty might be manifested in a reduced sense of freedom to hire a woman when they perceive such prejudice. Therefore, we predicted that participants would feel less free to hire a female candidate when there were cues suggesting third-party prejudice against women (vs. no cues; i.e., Hypothesis 3).

Method

Participants. Overall, 457 individuals completed the study via MTurk. We excluded nine participants (1.9%) who indicated that their answers were random or meant as jokes. The final sample for analysis resulted in \( n = 448 \) (mean age = 31.34, \( SD = 10.40 \); 52.7% female; 76.3% White). Three participants (0.7%) did not indicate their gender. A sensitivity power analysis using G*Power 3.1 (Faul et al., 2007) showed a two-way MANOVA on a sample of this size \( (n = 448) \) with prejudice cues condition and participant gender as factors and two response variables is sufficient to detect a small effect, that is, \( f^2 = .013 \) (\( d = .23 \)) with power = .80 (assuming \( \alpha = .05 \)). Furthermore, a linear regression model with up to seven predictors (Faul et al., 2009) on a sample of this size \( (n = 448) \) is sufficient to detect a small effect (i.e., \( f^2 = .024; d = .31 \)) with power = .80, assuming \( \alpha = .05 \).

Procedure and measures. Participants read the same vignette as in Study 4 in which participants were asked to select a chief negotiator to oversee truce talks between two warring countries and were randomly assigned to one of two prejudice cues conditions: third-party prejudice cues versus no cues. After indicating their preference for a female or a male candidate, participants were asked to indicate how they felt about it by rating 18 items from the PANAS (Watson & Clark, 1994) from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely so). Six items tapped self-directed negative affect (ashamed, remorseful, guilty, angry at self, disgusted with self, dissatisfied with self); six items tapped general negative affect (upset, nervous, scared, afraid, frightened, distressed); and six items tapped positive affect (happy, proud, cheerful, delighted, inspired, joyful). All items were presented together in random order. Principal components analysis with varimax rotation confirmed three factors, one for self-directed negative affect (\( \alpha = .94 \)), one for general negative affect (\( \alpha = .92 \)), and one for positive affect (\( \alpha = .94 \)). Participants were then asked to indicate “How much freedom of choice do you feel you had to select either a male or female chief negotiator?” from 1 (not free at all) to 6 (completely free; Brief et al., 2000). This question was followed by two scales in counterbalanced order. We used four items from the Modern Sexism Scale (e.g., “Discrimination against women is no longer a problem in the United States;” Swim et al., 1995), rated from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree), presented in random order (\( \alpha = .82 \)). Participants also rated six items from the Motivation to Respond Without Sexism Scale (Klonis et al., 2005), from 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree), tapping both internal motivations (e.g., “I am personally motivated by my beliefs to be nonsexist toward women;” \( \alpha = .83 \)) and external motivations (“I attempt to appear nonsexist toward women in order to avoid disapproval from others;” \( \alpha = .83 \)), in random order. Demographic questions and debriefing followed.

Results

Means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations are presented in Table 4. Additional analyses for Study 5 that were not directly related to the focal hypotheses are reported in the online supplemental materials. To test our predictions that participants would express a lower preference to hire a female candidate (Hypothesis 1) and that they would feel constrained in their freedom to do otherwise (Hypothesis 3) when there were cues that the third party was prejudiced against women (vs. no cues), we conducted a 2 (Prejudice Cues Condition: third-party prejudice cues vs. no cues) \( \times \) 2 (Participant Gender: male vs. female) MANOVA on (a) preference for a female candidate and (b) freedom of choice.

There was a significant main effect of prejudice cues condition on preference for a female candidate, \( F(1, 441) = 43.11, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .089 \). As expected, participants showed a lower preference for a female candidate in the third-party prejudice cues condition (\( M = 3.01, SD = 2.17 \)) relative to the control condition (\( M = 4.30, SD = 1.89 \)), \( t(441) = 2.27, p < .05 \). In both prejudice cues conditions, participants showed a significant preference for a male over a female candidate, represented by a mean that was significantly lower than five (which indicated no gender preference) in the control condition, \( t(229) = -4.53, p < .001, d = -.37 \), and in the third-party prejudice cues condition, \( t(228) = -13.50, p < .001, d = -.92 \). Although we expected independent effects for prejudice cues and participant gender on preference for a female candidate, the main effect of participant

| Table 4 Means, Standard Deviations, and Bivariate Correlations Between Variables in Study 5 |
|---------------------------------------------|-----------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| M (SD)                                      | 1              | 2         | 3         | 4         | 5         | 6         | 7         | 8         | 9         |
| 1. Preference cues (0 = control, 1 = third-party prejudice) | —              | —         | —         | —         | —         | —         | —         | —         | —         |
| 2. Participant gender (0 = M, 1 = F)        | —              | —         | —         | —         | —         | —         | —         | —         | —         |
| 3. Preference female candidate              | 3.65 (2.13)    | —.30**    | .04       | —.20**    | —         | —         | —         | —         | —         |
| 4. Modern sexism                            | 2.27 (1.88)    | .03       | —.28**    | —.20**    | —         | —         | —         | —         | —         |
| 5. Internal motivation                      | 7.21 (1.82)    | .07       | .21**     | .10       | —.42**    | —         | —         | —         | —         |
| 6. External motivation                      | 4.06 (2.21)    | .02       | —.09      | —.14**    | .12**     | —.01     | —         | —         | —         |
| 7. Sense of freedom                         | 4.20 (1.80)    | —.47**    | —.11**    | .38**     | .09       | —.10**   | —.03     | —         | —         |
| 8. Positive affect                          | 2.11 (1.30)    | —.11**    | —.14**    | .29**     | .14**     | —.13**   | —.02     | —.36**    | —         |
| 9. Self-directed negative affect            | 1.67 (1.86)    | .19**     | —.03      | —.17**    | .03       | .10**    | .16**    | —.39**    | —.13**    |
| 10. General negative affect                 | 1.93 (1.97)    | .03       | —.05      | .05       | .06       | .21**    | —.15**   | .00       | .62**     |

*p < .05. **p < .01.
gender was not significant, \( F(1, 441) = .61, p = .434, \eta^2_g = .001 \). The interaction between prejudice cues condition and participant gender was not significant, either, \( F(1, 441) = 3.43, p = .065, \eta^2_g = .008 \).

Supporting Hypothesis 3, there was a significant main effect of prejudice cues condition on freedom of choice, \( F(1, 441) = 125.25, p < .001, \eta^2_g = .221 \). Participants in the third-party prejudice cues condition felt less free to make their own choice (\( M = 3.37, SD = 1.77 \)) relative to those in the control (i.e., no cues) condition (\( M = 5.05, SD = 1.39 \)), \( M_b = -1.67, SE = .15, 95\% \text{ CI} [-1.963, -1.377] \). There was also a significant main effect of participant gender on feelings of freedom, \( F(1, 441) = 8.66, p = .003, \eta^2_g = .019 \), qualified by a significant interaction with prejudice cues condition, \( F(1, 441) = 5.15, p = .024, \eta^2_g = .012 \). Although men and women reported feeling similarly free in the control condition, \( F(1, 441) = .22, p = .636, \eta^2_g = .001 \), women compared with men felt significantly less free to choose when there were cues to third-party prejudice (\( M_D = -.78, SE = .21 \)), 95\% CI [-1.190, -.366], \( F(1, 441) = 13.78, p < .001, \eta^2_g = .030 \).

Effect of modern sexism on preference for a female candidate. In order to examine the direct effect of modern sexism on preference for a female candidate and whether it moderated the effect of prejudice cues, we tested a hierarchical linear regression model with prejudice cues condition (0 = control, 1 = third-party prejudice cues), participant gender (0 = male, 1 = female), and modern sexism (mean-centered), as well as all interaction terms as predictors of preference for a female candidate. As we expected, higher modern sexism scores were associated with a lower preference for a female candidate relative to a male candidate, \( b = -.47, SE = .11, p < .001 \). The interaction between modern sexism and prejudice cues condition was not significant, \( b = .23, SE = .21, p = .280 \).

Affective reactions. To replicate Study 4, we first performed 2 x 2 (Prejudice Cues Condition: third-party prejudice cues vs. no cues) x 2 (Participant Gender: male vs. female) MANOVA on (a) self-directed negative affect, (b) positive affect, and (c) general negative affect. As expected, we found significant main effects of prejudice cues condition on self-directed negative affect, \( F(1, 441) = 16.13, p < .001, \eta^2_g = .035 \), and on positive affect, \( F(1, 441) = 6.24, p = .013, \eta^2_g = .014 \). As illustrated in Figure 5, self-directed negative affect was higher when there were cues to third-party prejudice (\( M = 1.83, SD = .90 \)) compared with the control (i.e., no cues) condition (\( M = 1.50, SD = .79 \)), \( M_b = .32, SE = .08, 95\% \text{ CI} [.165, .482] \). In contrast, positive affect was lower in the third-party prejudice cues condition (\( M = 1.99, SD = 1.09 \)) compared with the control condition (\( M = 2.24, SD = 1.09 \)), \( M_D = -.26, SE = .10, 95\% \text{ CI} [-.460, -.055] \). However, prejudice cues had no effect on general negative affect, \( F(1, 441) = .42, p = .516, \eta^2_g = .001 \).

As in Study 4, we also predicted that participants’ expressed preference for a male or female candidate would mediate the effect of prejudice cues condition on self-directed negative affect (Hypothesis 4). Mediation analysis using Model 4 in the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2013) with 10,000 bootstraps (95\% bias corrected) supported this prediction, \( b = .06, SE = .03, 95\% \text{ CI} [.016, .122] \).

Effect of motivation to respond without sexism on affective reactions. In order to examine whether feelings of guilt as a result of prejudice accommodation varied as a function of participants’ motivations to respond without sexism, we tested a regression model with prejudice cues condition (0 = control, 1 = third-party prejudice cues) and external and internal motivation to respond without sexism (mean-centered), as well as all interaction terms, as predictors of self-directed negative affect. The interaction between prejudice condition and external motivation was not significant, \( b = -.02, SE = .04, p = .514 \). However, analyses revealed a significant interaction effect for internal motivation and prejudice cues, \( b = .11, SE = .04, p = .016 \), which is plotted in Figure 6. Simple slopes analysis (Aiken & West, 1991) showed a significant main effect of prejudice cues for participants with relatively high internal motivation (i.e., +1 SD above the mean in internal motivation), \( b = .50, SE = .11, p < .001 \), such that they reported feeling significantly guiltier about their selections in the third-party prejudice cues condition (vs. control). In contrast, the main effect of prejudice cues was not significant for participants with relatively low internal motivation (i.e., −1 SD below the mean in internal motivation), \( b = .11, SE = .11, p = .350 \).

Discussion
As expected, we found that individual-level gender bias was directly associated with lower overall preference for a female candidate. However, we found no evidence that these personal attitudes explained the tendency to accommodate third-party prejudice in hiring contexts, as we observed a similar accommodation tendency among participants with high and low modern sexism scores. In other words, we observed accommodation of third-party prejudice even among people for whom such prejudice runs somewhat contrary to their own attitudes.

In line with Hypothesis 4 and replicating the results of Study 4, participants in Study 5 felt guiltier after accommodating third-party prejudice against women compared to the control condition. Extending Study 4, Study 5 showed that this affective reaction was confined to feelings of guilt rather than negative affect in general. Moreover, such feelings of guilt were apparent to the extent that participants had internalized egalitarian values to avoid behaving in a sexist manner. Study 5 also revealed as expected that participants felt a constrained sense of freedom to hire a female candidate when the third party was perceived to be prejudiced compared...
leadership roles (Koenig et al., 2011), and these stereotypes could influence participant hiring decisions. Based on this reasoning, we examined whether stereotype endorsement differed when there were cues to third-party prejudice against women (vs. no cues), and whether such differences mediated the effect of cues to third-party prejudice against women on gatekeepers’ preference for a female candidate.

Method

Participants. In total, 407 participants completed the study via MTurk. We excluded eight individuals (1.9%) who indicated that their answers were random or meant as jokes. The final sample for analysis resulted in n = 399 (mean age = 34.17, SD = 11.45; 65.9% female; 77.9% White). Three participants (0.8%) did not indicate their gender. A sensitivity power analysis using G*Power 3.1 (Faul et al., 2007) showed a two-way MANOVA on a sample of this size (n = 399) with prejudice cues condition and participant gender as factors and two response variables is sufficient to detect a small effect, that is, $f^2 = 0.015$ (d = 0.24) with power = .80 (assuming $\alpha = .05$). Moreover, a linear regression model with up to six predictors (Faul et al., 2009) is sufficient to detect a small moderation effect (i.e., $f^2 = 0.019$; d = 0.27) with power = .80 (assuming $\alpha = .05$).

Procedure. Participants read a vignette similar to Study 1, in which they were asked to select a VP of operations for a technology company who would report to the CEO (i.e., the third party). As in Study 1, for half of participants, the CEO was said to endorse beliefs that have been shown to be indicative of prejudice against women (Stroebe et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2012) whereas for the other half of the participants these cues were omitted from the scenario. After the vignette, participants received instructions about the selection task, but were told that they would make their decision at a later time (presented in full in the online supplemental materials). At this point, we measured gender stereotype endorsement. Then, participants were reminded about their task and indicated their selection from 1 (definitely select a man) to 9 (definitely select a woman). Basic demographic questions (e.g., age, gender), and a short debriefing letter followed.

Endorsement of gender stereotypes. We used a scale by Rudman and Kilias (2000) in which participants rated 10 traits on 7-point scales that were anchored by the endpoints −3 (more true of women) and 3 (more true of men). Five traits assessed masculine stereotypes of agency (individualistic, competitive, independent, hierarchical, and self-sufficient) and five traits assessed feminine stereotypes of communality (communal, interdependent, supportive, kinship-oriented, and connected). Mean judgments of feminine stereotypes were subtracted from mean judgments of masculine stereotypes, such that scores ranged from −6 to 6, with higher scores indicating stronger endorsement (i.e., more stereotypical gender beliefs). After excluding one item ("self-sufficient") the scale reached good internal reliability, $\alpha = .71$.

Results

Means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations are presented in Table 5. To test Hypothesis 1 and the potential effect of prejudice cues on stereotype endorsement, we first conducted a 2 (Prejudice Cues Condition: third-party prejudice cues vs. no cues) × 2 (Participant Gender: male vs. female) MANOVA on (a) preference for a female candidate and (b) stereotype endorsement.
Table 5
Means, Standard Deviations, and Bivariate Correlations Between Variables in Study 6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>M (SD)</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Prejudice cues (0 = control, 1 = third-party prejudice)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Participant gender (0 = M, 1 = F)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Preference female candidate</td>
<td>4.62 (2.01)</td>
<td>—.15**</td>
<td>.12*</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Endorsement of gender stereotypes</td>
<td>1.24 (1.28)</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.13*</td>
<td>-.11*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05, **p < .01.

As expected, there was a significant main effect of prejudice cues condition on preference for a female candidate, F(1, 389) = 9.05, p = .003, η² = .023: Preference for a female (relative to a male) candidate was significantly lower when there were cues to third-party prejudice (M = 4.31, SD = 2.21) compared with the control (i.e., no cues) condition (M = 4.92, SD = 1.76), M₁ = -.64, SE = .21, 95% CI [-.1.060, -.222]. When there were no cues to third-party prejudice, participants exhibited no clear preference for a female or a male candidate, as evidenced by a mean that was not significantly different from the midpoint of five (which indicated no preference for one candidate over the other), t(199) = -.479, p = .633, d = -.04. However, in the third-party prejudice cues condition, there was a significant preference for a male over a female candidate, t(198) = -4.29, p < .001, d = -.31. Consistent with path b in Figure 1, there was a significant main effect of participant gender on preference for a female candidate, F(1, 389) = 4.68, p = .031, η² = .012, such that women had stronger preference for a female candidate (M = 4.79, SD = 2.04) relative to men (M = 4.27, SD = 1.92), M₂ = .46, SE = .21, 95% CI [.042, .880].

Prejudice cues condition had no effect on stereotype endorsement, F(1, 389) = .22, p = .640, η² = .001. There was a significant main effect of participant gender on endorsement of gender stereotypes, F(1, 389) = 6.48, p = .011, η² = .016, which was stronger among female participants (M = 1.36, SD = 1.33) compared with male participants (M = 1.02, SD = 1.15), M₁ = .35, SE = .14, 95% CI [.079, .618]. No other effects were significant, ps > .315.

As would be expected, stronger endorsement of gender stereotypes was associated with significantly lower preference for a female candidate, as shown in Table 5, and in line with path e in Figure 1. However, stereotype endorsement did not mediate the effect of third-party prejudice condition on preference for a female candidate, b = -.005, SE = .02, 95% CI [-.066, .039] (10,000 bootstraps, 95% bias corrected).

Given that prejudice cues condition did not impact stereotype endorsement, we examined whether stereotype endorsement might have moderated the effect of prejudice cues on preference for a female over a male candidate, in line with our analysis for modern sexism (Swim et al., 1995) in Study 5. We did this by testing a hierarchical linear regression model with prejudice cues condition (0 = control, 1 = third-party prejudice cues), participant gender (0 = male, 1 = female), and stereotype endorsement (mean-centered), as well as all interaction terms as predictors of preference for a female candidate. There was no significant interaction between prejudice cues condition and stereotype endorsement, b = -.009, SE = .16, p = .953.

Discussion

As would be expected on the basis of previous work demonstrating the adverse effect of endorsement of gender stereotypes on hiring female candidates for male-dominated positions (Heilman, 2001) and as reflected by path e in Figure 1, Study 6 revealed that stronger endorsement of gender stereotypes was associated with lower preference to hire a female executive in a male-dominated industry, and this effect was separate from the influence of experimental cues suggesting third-party prejudice against women. We found no evidence in Study 6 that participants adopted the views of the third party or that third-party prejudice functioned as a cue to organizational norms condoning discrimination. In Study 7, we tested another possible alternative explanation for the third-party prejudice effect by investigating the motive to get along or affiliate with the third party (i.e., the source of influence from a normative perspective).

Study 7

In this final experiment, we examined the possibility that participants might heed the preferences of another person out of a desire to maintain a strong affiliative bond (Sinclair et al., 2005). From this perspective, in addition to role demands, gatekeepers might accommodate third-party prejudice more readily when further motivated by a desire to affiliate with the third party. We tested these ideas in Study 7, in which we investigated the relationship between affiliation motivation, a strong concern with establishing or maintaining a positive relationship with another person or group (Atkinson, Heyns, & Veroff, 1958), and the tendency to accommodate third-party prejudice. We did this by experimentally varying the desire to affiliate with the third party and comparing the tendency to accommodate third-party prejudice relative to an experimental control condition. From an affiliative perspective, when participants have a stronger motivation to maintain a social bond with a third party (vs. a control condition), we would expect that they would show a greater tendency to accommodate third-party prejudice in their decisions.

Method

Participants. In total, 416 individuals participated online via MTurk. We excluded six participants (1.4%) because they indicated that their answers were random or meant as jokes. The final sample for analysis resulted in n = 410 (mean age = 33.66, SD = 10.03; 61.5% female; 76.8% White). A sensitivity power analysis using G Power 3.1 (Faul et al., 2007) showed a three-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) with n = 410 and with prejudice cues condition, affiliation condition, and participant gender as factors is sufficient to detect a small effect (i.e., f = .14; d = .28) with power = .80, assuming α = .05.

Procedure. Participants read the same vignette as in Study 6 and previous studies involving the hiring of a VP of operations.
The content of the vignette was presented in two parts. Participants were first introduced to the scenario up until the point in which they learned that the new hire would report directly to the company CEO. Then, a random half of participants read a short passage meant to increase their desire to affiliate with the third party (vs. no information):

By chance, you have just heard through the grapevine that the CEO is looking for someone to lead the tech company’s newly formed human resources department. This would be your dream job, so you really want the CEO to like you.

As a manipulation check, participants were asked to rate the following items from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree):
(a) “It was important for me to get the CEO to like me”;
(b) “I really wanted to impress the CEO;” and (c) “If the CEO got a negative impression of me, that would bother me” (α = .72).
Participants were then reminded of their task, and that the new hire would report to the CEO, which we described as holding beliefs indicative of gender bias (Stroebe et al., 2011) versus no cues to prejudice. Participants then indicated their preference for a female or a male candidate, from 1 (definitely select a man) to 9 (definitely select a woman). Then, all participants answered basic demographic questions (e.g., age, gender), followed by debriefing.

Results

As intended, there was a significant main effect of affiliation condition on desire to affiliate with the third party, $F(1, 408) = 41.44, p < .001$, $\eta^2_p = .092$, which was higher in the high affiliation condition (vs. control; $M_D = .39, SE = .06$), 95% CI [.272, .512].

To test the potential effect of affiliation motivations on the tendency to accommodate third-party prejudice, we conducted a 2 (Prejudice Cues Condition: third-party prejudice cues vs. no cues) $\times$ 2 (Participant Gender: male vs. female) ANOVA on preference for a female candidate, which revealed a significant main effect of prejudice cues condition, $F(1, 402) = 14.21, p < .001$, $\eta^2_p = .034$: Preference for a female candidate was lower in the third-party prejudice cues condition ($M = 3.68, SD = 1.97$) versus the control condition ($M = 4.37, SD = 1.51$), $M_D = -.68$, $SE = .18$, 95% CI $[-1.031, - .324]$. In both prejudice cues conditions, participants had a significant preference for a male over a female candidate, represented by a mean significantly lower than five (which indicated no preference for one candidate over the other) in the control condition, $t(202) = -5.94, p < .001,$ $d = -.42$ and in the third-party prejudice cues condition, $t(206) = -9.62, p < .001,$ $d = -.67$.

There was no significant main effect of affiliation condition, $F(1, 402) = 1.12, p = .291, \eta^2_p = .003$, nor a significant interaction between affiliation condition and prejudice cues condition, $F(1, 402) = .002, p = .963, \eta^2_p < .001$. In line with path b in the model, there was a significant main effect of participant gender on preference for a female candidate, $F(1, 402) = 6.88, p = .009, \eta^2_p = .017$, which was stronger among female participants ($M = 4.21, SD = 1.87$) compared with male participants ($M = 3.72, SD = 1.61$), $M_D = .47, SE = .18$, 95% CI [.118, .825]. No other effects were significant, ps > .288.

Discussion

The results of Study 7 provide no evidence for the perspective that an affiliation motivation might underlie the tendency to accommodate third-party prejudice (Blanchard et al., 1994; Brief et al., 1995, 2000). We similarly found in a pretest ($n = 495$), which is described in full in the online supplemental materials, that prejudice accommodation might be independent from participants’ chronic motivation to get along with others, as measured by their need to belong (Leary, Kelly, Cottrell, & Schreindorfer, 2013) and interpersonal orientation (Hill, 1987). Similarly, although the affiliation manipulation in Study 7 had the expected effect of increasing interest in bonding with the third party, this heightened motivation did not translate into increased accommodation of third-party prejudice. Instead, participants accommodated third-party prejudice even when they were not particularly motivated to affiliate with the third party, which is not incompatible with our rationale that accommodation stems primarily from the demands of the gatekeeper role that may or may not coexist with a desire to affiliate with relevant third parties.

Internal Meta-Analysis

We conducted an internal meta-analysis to estimate the overall magnitude of the third-party prejudice effect, in line with past recommendations (Goh et al., 2016). The effect of interest was the difference in preference for or selection of a female candidate between the conditions in which there were cues indicating third-party prejudice against women and the conditions in which such cues were not provided in Studies 1–7 ($n = 3,048$). See online supplemental materials for additional details. We represented the effect of each study as a weighted standardized mean difference (Cohen’s $d$), and employed OpenMetaAnalyst software (Wallace, Schmid, Lau, & Trikalinos, 2009) using the DerSimonian-Laird method to perform a random-effects analysis, which is more conservative than fixed-effects and affords greater generalizability with few studies (Goh et al., 2016). Results revealed that, across studies, when there were cues to third-party prejudice (vs. no cues) the female candidate was less likely to be selected by $d = -.46$, 95% CI $[-.554, -.367], p = .001$. This is a medium effect (Cohen, 1988), the magnitude of which is plotted separately for each condition in Figure 7. The size of this effect is well above the minimum threshold of detection derived from sensitivity power analyses across studies (Faul et al., 2007, 2009), which ranged from $d = .17$ (Study 1) to $d = .34$ (Study 5). Heterogeneity of $\ldots$
effects was low to moderate and not significant, \( I^2 = 39.9, \ p = .125 \).

Given that a significant main effect of participant gender on preference to hire female candidates emerged in some (but not all) studies, we sought to examine this evidence meta-analytically in order to estimate the overall magnitude of the direct effect of gatekeeper social identity (i.e., path b in the model). Thus, we compared the mean difference in preference for and selection of a female candidate between female participants \( (n = 1,749) \) and male participants \( (n = 1,290) \) in each study. We represented these participant gender differences across experimental conditions in each study as a weighted standardized mean difference (Cohen’s d). Results revealed a significant overall difference, such that female participants showed a small but reliable preference for female candidates relative to male participants, \( d = .14, 95\% \ CI [.219, .060], \ p < .001 \).

Finally, we examined whether participant gender moderated the meta-analytic effect of prejudice cues condition by comparing the mean difference in preference for and selection of a female candidate between the third-party prejudice cues condition and the control (i.e., no cues) condition for female participants and male participants in each study. We represented these participant gender differences in the prejudice accommodation effect in each study as a weighted standardized mean difference (Cohen’s d). Results revealed that, across studies, the participant gender difference was not significant, \( d = .19, 95\% \ CI [-.985, 1.358], \ p = .755 \), providing a strong indication that gatekeepers accommodated third-party prejudice against women regardless of their own self-identification as male or female.

**General Discussion**

The goal of the present research was to examine how beliefs about other people’s prejudices can elicit discriminatory hiring decisions to accommodate these biases. Previous research has addressed this issue from the perspective of normative influence, which suggests that people may behave in alignment with the perceived prejudices of others due to a normative desire to be accepted by them or avoid their disapproval (Blanchard et al., 1994; Crandall & Eshleman, 2003) and obedience to the direct instructions of authorities (Brief et al., 1995, 2000). While acknowledging such effects, drawing on an additional theoretical perspective, role theory (e.g., Biddle, 1979, 1986), we proposed that the demands, expectations, responsibilities, and obligations associated with a social position that one occupies could promote the accommodation of third-party prejudice (i.e., the “third-party prejudice effect”) even in situations in which the motivation to gain others’ approval is relatively low and there is no direct attempt by an authority figure to dictate how one should behave in the situation. Guided by role theory, we hypothesized that individuals in gatekeeper roles weigh and accommodate the preferences and biases of others because of concerns to meet the demands of their formal roles. We predicted that role demands operate in addition to other factors, such as gender-related attitudes, stereotypes, and social identities, to influence decisions about whether to select a comparably qualified woman or man for a position. Overall, we found considerable evidence in line with our predictions.

**Overview of Key Findings**

Consistent with our hypothesis, across seven experiments we found that role-relevant interpersonal and task-focused concerns can lead individuals in gatekeeper roles in charge of hiring to accommodate the perceived prejudices of a relevant third party in the absence of explicit orders. This tendency to accommodate others’ prejudice led participants in each of these experiments to make discriminatory hiring decisions that disadvantaged female candidates when there were cues signaling that a relevant third party might be biased against women. As expected, even though the third party made no direct requests, the inference of third-party prejudice against women reduced participants’ sense of freedom to
select a female candidate, reflecting a perceived duty to take the preferences of relevant parties into account when hiring (Study 5). Although this sense of duty may sometimes coexist with a personal desire to affiliate with the third party, it may operate largely separately from such a motivation to be liked or accepted by others (Blanchard et al., 1994; Brief et al., 1995, 2000): We found in Study 7 that increasing affiliative motives experimentally did not exacerbate the tendency to accommodate the prejudices of a relevant third party.

Moreover, as expected, Studies 3 and 4 supported our prediction that gatekeepers accommodated third-party prejudice when hiring and coordinating others because of concerns relevant to the gatekeeper role. Specifically, when they had reason to believe that the third party was prejudiced against women, participants reported stronger interpersonal concerns about the potential for social friction between a female candidate and the third party and stronger task-focused concerns that, ultimately, hiring a woman might jeopardize the mission at hand. In this way, the perception that a relevant third party held gender-based prejudice rendered the decision to hire a woman overall less compatible with the demands of the gatekeeper role. When gatekeepers received a reassurance that a female candidate would be successful in Study 4, this information had the intended effect of reducing the accommodation of third-party prejudice.

In addition to a role-based theory, we tested two potential complementary explanations for the accommodation of third-party prejudice. One of these explanations, examined in Study 6, centered on the possible informational value of third-party prejudice (Cialdini et al., 1991) that might conceivably shape the content of a person’s stereotypes about a given group (Wood, 2000), resulting in discrimination against female candidates. However, in Study 6, cues that a relevant third party might be prejudiced against working women did not result in stronger endorsement of gender stereotypes, while the third-party prejudice cue manipulation still influenced selection decisions. In Study 7, we tested another explanation for prejudice accommodation that centered on a desire to affiliate with the third party (Blanchard et al., 1994; Brief et al., 1995, 2000), but we did not find evidence to support it. Increasing affiliative motivations experimentally in Study 7 did not exacerbate the third-party prejudice effect. Although null effects need to be interpreted with caution (Greenwald, 1975), the findings across Studies 6 and 7 suggest that it may not be necessary for gatekeepers to internalize third-party bias in order to accommodate it in their selections, and that the influence of third-party prejudice may operate independently from a desire to bond with or be accepted by the third party.

In our studies, in which role demands were strong and clear, we found as predicted that the influence of third-party prejudice could operate separately from any effects of gatekeepers’ own beliefs and social identities. Thus, although female (vs. male) participants sometimes had a stronger preference for a woman (as in past research; Koch et al., 2015), women and men across the seven studies accommodated the perceived biases of male third parties, and the meta-analytic integration of results revealed no moderation by participant gender. Similarly, although higher modern sexism scores predicted lower preference for a woman, as in prior research (e.g., Moss-Racusin et al., 2012), participants in Study 5 accommodated third-party prejudice against women regardless of their endorsement of modern sexism. And, whereas participant endorse-

ment of traditional gender stereotypes predicted their preference to hire a woman (Heilman, 2001), independently from this effect, participants in Study 6 showed reduced preference to hire a woman when a relevant third-party held traditional gender attitudes.

Whereas personal gender-related attitudes and stereotypes directly predicted preference for a male over a female candidate, the effect of participant gender was somewhat mixed. Female participants showed a significantly stronger preference to hire a female candidate than male participants in three out of the seven studies (i.e., Studies 3, 6, and 7), but the difference was not significant in the other four studies. Our meta-analysis revealed a small but statistically significant overall effect for gender, such that female (vs. male) participants more strongly preferred a female candidate. Previous reviews of the literature concerning women’s and men’s preferences have also noted variability in effects (see Vial, Napier, & Brescoll, 2016) but an overall preference for gender in-group members when aggregated meta-analytically across multiple studies (e.g., Koch et al., 2015; Paustian-Underdahl, Walker, & Woehr, 2014). Given the heterogeneity of results for gender in the current research, as well as in previous work, future investigations might examine more directly factors that may moderate when gender in-group preferences will occur more strongly and consistently.

Although personal biases and third-party prejudice cues had independent effects on the preference for female relative to male candidates, the accommodation of third-party prejudice due to role demands did affect how people felt about their decision differently as a function of participants’ personal standards. Specifically, Study 5 revealed that participants felt guilty after accommodating prejudice to the extent that they had internalized egalitarian values to avoid behaving in a sexist manner (in line with Monteith et al., 1993). People in these contexts might also feel guilty simply for having made an unfair decision, or for failing to stand up to bigotry. Either way, one productive direction for future research, extending the present work, would be to explore the potential consequences of the guilt that gatekeepers may experience when they accommodate third-party prejudice in a way that is at odds with their personal standards. For instance, if gatekeepers feel guilty for accommodating prejudice, as our studies suggest, perhaps they would be more likely to champion diversity on a separate occasion as a way to assuage the resulting guilt (Tangney, Stuewig, & Hafez, 2011).

**Implications**

As a whole, results across studies provided evidence for the impact of third-party prejudice on gatekeepers’ decisions in various contexts in which the third party did not make a direct influence attempt, but where accommodating the perceived preferences of others was necessary in order to meet role demands. The focus on the accommodation of prejudice in the absence of explicit requests extends prior work showing that people obey an authority’s explicit instructions to discriminate in order to avoid punishment (Brief et al., 1995, 2000). This extension represents an important contribution because direct demands to discriminate against protected groups are not only illegal in the United States, but also strongly discouraged in contemporary society (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986), and as a result may be relatively rare. Instead, prejudice often leaks out in subtle ways (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003), such as through nonverbal cues (Goh & Hall, 2015), and
gatekeepers may be aware of the biases of other people much like
the threat of stereotypes is “in the air” (Steele, 1997). Our studies
suggest that, insofar as decision makers suspect third-party preju-
dice, such prejudice will be influential in their decisions via
role-relevant considerations even in the absence of explicit influ-
ence attempts.

Our demonstration of third-party prejudice accommodation
drawing on a role-based framework can offer new conceptual and
practical insights for additional research geared toward under-
standing why group inequality persists even though people today
espouse more egalitarian attitudes than in the past (Cotter et al.,
2011). Whereas individuals’ attitudes toward members of under-
represented groups tend to be a modest predictor of discriminatory
behaviors (Oswald, Mitchell, Blanton, Jaccard, & Tetlock, 2013),
contextual factors such as institutional practices and state laws and
policies can also contribute to group inequality (Corrigan et al.,
2005). The current set of studies revealed that, regardless of their
own attitudes and personal identities, gatekeepers channel the
biases of other people resulting in discriminatory decisions that
may perpetuate institutional biases (Luakhcho, Hatzenbuehler, &
Keyes, 2014). As such, gatekeeper role demands, priorities, and
responsibilities could represent a key interface through which
structural and institutional bias (Feagin & Feagin, 1978; Stamarski
& Son Hing, 2015) is expressed and reinforced in hiring decisions
involving female candidates.

Remaining Questions and Future Directions

Researchers may build upon the current findings in the future in
a number of ways. For example, further evidence in support of our
role theory interpretation of why people in gatekeeper roles may
accommodate third-party prejudice would come from research
testing whether personal identification or strength of commitment
with the gatekeeper role (Stryker & Burke, 2000) could alter the
tendency to accommodate third-party prejudice. Those who iden-
tify more strongly with a role are more likely to exhibit role-
consistent behavior (Grube & Piliavin, 2000) and, as a result,
individuals who identify very strongly with the gatekeeper role
might also be more likely to accommodate prejudice in hiring
decisions for role-related reasons. To illustrate, Petersen and Dietz
(2008) found that White participants’ strength of organizational
commitment predicted their tendency to obey a White authority’s
direct orders to keep the workforce homogenous (i.e., by hiring a
White rather than a Black job applicant). In a comparable manner,
gatekeepers who identify most strongly with their role may also be
the ones who would most readily accommodate prejudice from
within the organization.

Similarly, in the current investigation, we hypothesized that role
demands represent an important influence to consider for under-
standing discrimination against women, in addition to rather than
as a competing framework for normative influence—but it would be
valuable for future research to further probe the potential
interplay between role demands and normative influence factors.
We acknowledge the substantial evidence that normative influence
plays an important role in hiring discrimination (Brief et al., 1995,
2000). Across the seven current experiments, we were careful to
activate role-based expectations while limiting opportunities for
normative influence related to the demands of a particular organi-
zation (e.g., by constructing situations in which gatekeepers did
not belong to the same organization as the third party). However,
when gatekeepers are embedded in the same organization as the
third party or in a social group in which strong conformity and
loyalty are expected, features associated with normative social
influence such as the level of authority of the third party (Brief et
al., 2000) may exacerbate the tendency to accommodate prejudice
due to role-relevant reasons.

One intriguing possibility to examine in the future is how
individual difference factors such as personal beliefs and social
identities might be implicated in the process of prejudice accom-
modation. In our studies, we purposely created situations in which
role demands and responsibilities were clear and strong, a feature
that makes the influence of roles particularly powerful. Under
these conditions, men and women were just as likely to accom-
modate third-party prejudice against women. However, as role
definitions change or the responsibilities of a given role become
lax or ambiguous, gatekeepers’ decisions may be more reflective
of their own group preferences, gender attitudes, and social iden-
tities (Mischel, 2004). For example, in Study 4, reducing the
strength of role demands by alleviating task-focused concerns
eliminated the accommodation of third-party prejudice against
women among female participants, but not male participants. This
disparity, which we had not predicted, suggests that gatekeepers
might be highly receptive to information that would make it
possible to express their own values and preferences (e.g., in-group
favoritism) without neglecting role duties. Given that the salience
and behavioral impact of both roles (Chang et al., 1988) and
social identities (Ambady, Shih, Kim, & Pittinsky, 2001) are
contextually dependent, it would be worthwhile to examine sys-
tematically which of these factors influence responses to third-
party prejudice most strongly across different contexts.

Although our research indicates that people with high and low
explicit prejudice do not respond to third-party prejudice any
differently, it is unclear whether people might differ in their
responses as a function of their implicit prejudice. Explicit preju-
dice represents an attitude that people know they hold and is
subject to deliberate control; implicit prejudice is an automatically
activated attitude, which often occurs without awareness. We
examined self-reports of gatekeepers’ gender views in Studies 4
and 5, because explicit (vs. implicit) attitude measures tend to be
better predictors of behaviors that are highly controlled and delib-
erate, such as the responses tested in the current research (Gawron-
ski & Bodenhausen, 2006). Participants’ explicit gender bias did
not moderate the accommodation effect. Nevertheless, role expec-
tations that promote disparate treatment of members of one group
over another may offer a socially acceptable justification for
discrimination for individuals with high implicit bias against
women (see also Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). High implicit bias
may increase the tendency to accommodate third-party prejudice,
even when high explicit bias did not. This is an empirical question
worth considering in future research seeking to further bridge
normative and role-based motivations for prejudice accommoda-
tion.

Finally, whereas we focused on gender bias, the effects uncov-
ered in our studies may extend to other domains such as racism and
homophobia, and future research may generalize our findings to
other types of prejudice. The social acceptability of bias often
depends on its target (e.g., prejudice against overweight people is
more accepted than racism; Crandall, Eshleman, & O’Brien,
2002). From this normative perspective, it is possible that certain third-party biases (e.g., against specific groups) might be intolerable and gatekeepers would refuse to accommodate them. The findings from our studies suggest that, when role demands are sufficiently strong, gatekeepers might feel constrained in their freedom to express their disapproval of third-party prejudice—but when role demands are more ambiguous, relatively less normative third-party views may encounter more resistance. Additional research may examine whether changing role demands may embolden gatekeepers to reject prejudice that they find intolerable. Conversely, whereas we provided cues to third-party gender attitudes that were rather hostile in nature (e.g., that women are not very smart and complain too much; Study 2), it is possible that more benevolently sexist views, which can also disadvantage women (Glick & Fiske, 1996), would be accommodated to an even higher degree.

Limitations

We acknowledge limitations in the current work, which may also be addressed systematically in further research. Although our experiments provided evidence that third-party prejudice accommodation occurs in large part because the cues of another person’s bias activates concerns relevant to the gatekeeper role (task-focused and interpersonal), one caveat to this finding is that there was some ambiguity in the wording of the items tapping interpersonal concerns in both Studies 3 and 4. It is possible that participants may have interpreted the potential displeasure of the third party if a woman were hired to be directed toward them as decision-makers rather than toward the new hire herself—an issue that future studies should be careful to address. Moreover, different kinds of concerns may be weighed differently based on the particulars of the task to be accomplished by the new hire and the third party (Kerr, 2017), such as the degree of interdependence required to complete the task successfully. When the ultimate goal depends on having two people working together on a highly collaborative task for which cooperation is fundamental, interpersonal concerns are likely to rank extremely high on gatekeepers’ minds (Kristof-Brown et al., 2005). But when the task in question is less interdependent, interpersonal considerations might be less of a concern, and other aspects related to task success may take on more prominence (e.g., candidate qualifications).

Given that we communicated third-party prejudice in a relatively explicit manner, we acknowledge that experimental demand characteristics may have been aroused among our participants. Although recent work has shown that factors affecting experimental demand (e.g., directly providing information about a study’s purpose) may sometimes have only limited effects (Mummolo & Peterson, 2018; see also McCambridge, de Bruin, & Witton, 2012), future research on third-party prejudice accommodation would benefit from using paradigms in which participants are less likely to experience experimental demands—for example, by obscuring the true purpose of the research in more elaborate ways or testing the effect in field settings where participants may not be aware of being in an experiment. We do note, though, that we obtained similar results in studies in which participants were asked to make decisions involving a number of candidates (three in Study 1 and six in Study 2) whose profiles contained multiple pieces of information other than gender as in the studies in which candidate gender was primarily salient.

We also recognize another potential influence that could conceivably affect our results in systematic ways: social desirability concerns. Because prejudice is socially non-normative and people are motivated to be seen in socially positive ways, a main concern of prejudice research has been that people will fake their responses to appear less biased (Crandall et al., 2002; McConahay, 1986). A strong social desirability effect would work against our main hypothesis because it suggests that participants would reject rather than accommodate third-party prejudice. Nevertheless, further research on the topic of third-party prejudice accommodation should consider the potential influences of demand characteristics and social desirability responding in the development of new paradigms.

In addition to addressing any possible threats to internal validity, additional research would benefit from further investigation of the external validity of the results of the present research. Specifically, it would be informative and theoretically meaningful to evaluate the robustness of the third-party prejudice effect across samples with various preexisting role expectations and differential levels of experience in the workplace. In the current investigation, we were able to generalize our findings to adults online (MTurk) and a laboratory sample composed primarily of students in Study 1. However, to the extent that understanding the behavior specifically of people in particular organizational positions is a goal, the responses of MTurk workers or university students might not be representative of individuals in charge of hiring decisions (e.g., recruiters, hiring managers). It is possible, for example, that human resources professionals might have a relatively sophisticated understanding of the hiring role, the various stakeholders involved in staff decisions, and the overall expectations and demands for someone in this role (Rynes & Gerhart, 1990). Such awareness of role demands could make human resources professionals even more likely than other groups to ponder and accommodate the preferences (and prejudices) of relevant parties. If it were the case, however, that trained professionals were less sensitive to accommodating prejudice in their decisions than laypersons, such findings might shed light on ways to curtail the effect.

Conclusion

In closing, the present work revealed that people in roles in charge of hiring sometimes make decisions in ways that accommodate the perceived preferences of others (who may be more prejudiced than they are) due to a desire to meet the demands and obligations of their formal roles. These role demands, manifested in our studies in interpersonal and task-focused concerns about the hiring selection, may be operative regardless of the personal beliefs and social identity of the individual in the role, and may constrain gatekeepers’ sense of freedom to express their own individual preferences when a relevant third party is perceived to be biased in a particular direction. In this way, the biases held by relevant third parties may influence the decisions of presumably unbiased individuals, who accommodate third-party prejudice to meet role demands, even though they may feel guilty or remorseful about it.


(Appendices follow)
Appendix

Study 1 Stimuli

Vignette

“Imagine that you work at a recruitment agency dedicated to personnel selection and placement. A new, mid-size technology company has recently hired your agency to assist them in the recruitment of a VP of operations. As part of the role, the VP of operations will design a winning strategy for the company and oversee the directors and managers as they carry out the plan. As the new tech company is just starting out, the future of the organization will depend on whether the VP of operations succeeds. Also, your ability to keep your job depends critically on the success of the VP you select. If the VP you select is a failure, your agency’s reputation will suffer, and you may lose your job. The VP of operations will report directly to the company CEO.”

Prejudice Cues Manipulation

The parts in italics were omitted in the control (i.e., no cues) condition:

“The CEO, Gary A. is 50 years old and known for his politically conservative beliefs as well as his traditional views. Gary studied engineering at MIT and has been in the field of information technology for the past 12 years. The last 20 employees his company selected for a variety of roles have been 80% men and 20% women. He is married with four children. Gary believes that it is important for women to put families before careers and that, given the shortage of openings in today’s job market, positions with the most career promise should be given to individuals who are less likely to be distracted by their family life. His wife gave up her job right before their first child was born and has been a stay-at-home mom since.”